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1.1  Introduction 
 Over the past two decades, established firms have increasingly acquired startups 
as a source of new products and new technologies (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; 
Grandstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Link, 1988; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006).  At the 
same time, the willingness of established firms to finance entrepreneurial startups has 
dramatically increased (see Figure 1).  In this dissertation, I investigate how these two 
business development activities—corporate venture capital (CVC)1 investing and the 
acquisition of technology startups—might be related and explore the implications for 
firm performance.  Specifically, I seek to answer the following three questions: (1) How 
frequently do firms use CVC investments to screen potential acquisitions?  (2) How does 
a prior equity investment affect the acquirer’s returns if it subsequently chooses to 
acquire the startup? and (3) more broadly, do CVC investments represent a strategy for 
reducing information asymmetry in takeover markets for entrepreneurial firms?   
  This research is important for two reasons.   First, startups have become an 
increasingly important source of research-and-development (R&D).  According to 
National Science Foundation surveys (2005), the share of U.S. industrial R&D spending 
represented by firms with fewer than 1,000 employees climbed from 4.4% in 1980 to 
                                                 
1 Corporate venture capital is defined as minority equity investments in privately-held, entrepreneurial 
firms by established corporations.  I use the terms “young firm”, “entrepreneurial firm” and “startup” 
interchangeably throughout my dissertation.   
 1
more than 25.3% in 2003.F2F  As a result, established firms have increasingly acquired 
startups to gain access to new technologies (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 
1999; Link, 1988; Puranam et al., 2006). 
However, from the perspective of established firms, acquiring young, 
technological startups poses significant challenges.  Such acquisitions, by definition, 
involve companies that are young and small and therefore lack the track record of larger, 
more established companies (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008; Shen & Reuer, 2005).  
Moreover, these challenges are particularly acute when acquiring startups with few 
tangible assets and a heavy reliance on research and development (Coff, 1999, 2003).   
A second reason for conducting new research on this topic stems from a 
simultaneous increase in the willingness of established firms to provide venture funding 
to entrepreneurial ventures.  Between 1990 and 2000, annual CVC investments in 
startups grew from $156 million to $16 billion, and accounted for 15% of all venture 
capital investments that year (see figure 1, Venture Economics, 2005).  Recent work 
suggests that nearly 25% of new ventures receive some form of corporate funding 
(Rosenberger, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2006).   
This dissertation investigates possible linkages between these business 
development activities – does corporate venture capital indeed represent a mechanism for 
“coping” in difficult entrepreneurial-firm takeover markets?  My objectives are to 
evaluate both the prevalence of the use of this “coping mechanism” and how it affects the 
performance of established firms when acquiring startups. 
                                                 
2 Small companies also tend to be young, so these NSF statistics approximate shifts toward R&D 
performed by entrepreneurial firms. 
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A distinguishing feature of corporate venture capital is the dual objectives that 
companies typically employ when making investments.  In addition to seeking financial 
returns, CVC programs generally pursue strategic objectives as well (Yost & Devlin, 
1993).  For example, in surveys, CVC managers rate “exposure to new technologies and 
markets” and “identifying potential acquisition opportunities” as two of their top five 
reasons for investing in entrepreneurial firms (Alter & Buchsbaum, 2000; Siegel, Siegel, 
& MacMillan, 1988; Yost & Devlin, 1993).  Despite the importance of these strategic 
objectives, prior empirical research has largely focused on financial metrics common to 
both independent and corporate venture capitalists3 – the returns to investments upon exit 
events such as initial public offerings (IPOs) or sales to third parties (Gompers & Lerner, 
2000; Maula & Murray, 2002).   
In contrast, evidence on the use of CVC investments to inform acquisition 
decisions has largely been confined to surveys of managerial motives and case studies of 
individual CVC programs.  For example Dyer, Kale, and Singh (2004), in interviews with 
managers at Cisco, find that Cisco uses its venture funds to “evaluate firms to determine 
if acquisitions will work,” thus enabling them to make more informed decisions when 
purchasing innovative, young companies.  In line with this view, the authors report that 
Cisco had a prior venture investment in one out of every four companies it acquired 
through 2003.  Similarly, the director of Siemen’s venture arm stated that he views 
“every investment as a potential acquisition opportunity” (Wieland, 2005).   Despite such 
anecdotal evidence, however, this dissertation is the first to systematically examine (1) 
whether a prior CVC investment affects the performance of an acquisition of a portfolio 
                                                 
3 Independent venture capitalists (e.g. Kleiner Perkins, Sequoia Capital, Benchmark Capital, etc) are 
venture capitalists not associated with an established corporation.  I use the term “independent venture 
capitalists” and VCs synonymously. 
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company and (2) more broadly, whether CVC investments provide information that can 
affect all of the firm’s acquisitions of startups (even those in which the firm has not 
directly invested). 
 
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation Essays 
I examine the above questions using a blend of quantitative and qualitative 
methods.  Specifically, this dissertation includes two empirical studies that examine both 
the “direct” (e.g. the effect when acquiring portfolio companies) and “indirect” (the effect 
on all startups the firm acquires) impact of corporate venture capital investments and the 
acquisition of technology startups by established firms.  I supplement the quantitative 
analysis with interviews with a number of individuals involved with corporate venture 
capital.4   These interviews were very helpful in interpreting my econometric results 
(particularly for Chapter 2) as well as in the formulation of additional hypotheses (for 
Chapter 3).  Table 1 provides a brief summary of the dissertation chapters, their primary 
research questions, and their research design and sample.  I discuss each chapter in turn 
below. 
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Rosemarie Ziedonis, we tackle question of CVC’s 
direct effects.  Specifically, we examine (1) to what extent do CVC investors have pre-
existing venture investments with startups they acquire? And (2) how does such a prior 
investment affect the acquirer’s returns?  We then examine how such effects are 
                                                 
4 During 2005 and 2006, I conducted 31 open-ended interviews with individuals involved with corporate 
venture capital.  I conducted nine additional interviews in 2007-2008.  I spoke with providers of such 
capital (managers involved with making the investments) as well as co-investors (independent VCs) and 
recipients (entrepreneurs).  Some individuals had participated in corporate venture capital in multiple roles 
(e.g. had been at a corporate investor, but now was an independent VC, etc).  Chapter 2 draws primarily 
from the earlier set of interviews, while Chapter 3 uses insights from both sets of interviews. 
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moderated by the structure of the CVC program through which the investment is made.  
We test for two competing hypotheses: On the one hand, one might expect that acquirers’ 
returns will be higher for CVC acquisitions (e.g. acquisitions of startups from its CVC 
portfolio) than non-CVC acquisitions (startups acquired outright) because acquirers 
benefit from the enhanced information that CVC investments provide.  On the other 
hand, prior theory also predicts that the direct investment may make the corporate 
investor prone one of a number of biases—for example, overconfidence because of the 
personal involvement of CVC managers with their portfolio companies, or agency 
problems caused by misaligned incentives between the manager making the CVC 
investment and the goals of the larger organization (Brockner 1992; Fama 1980; Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008; Staw, 1981).  We test these 
hypotheses using the stock market’s reaction to compare the performance of CVC and 
non-CVC acquisitions made by 61 active corporate investors.   
The main findings of Chapter 2 show that acquisition returns are significantly 
lower (and significantly negative) when acquirers purchase startups in which they have a 
prior equity investment.  In contrast, acquirers earn positive and significant returns on 
average when they acquire startups outright (e.g. in which they have no prior equity 
investment).  Our empirical analysis can then be divided into three parts:  First, we 
examine whether the negative acquisition returns we observe truly indicate overpayment 
and do not merely reflect (1) the fact that the market incorporates information about the 
startup at the initial (CVC investment) stage, or (2) “disappointment” that the startup has 
been acquired and thus will not have an IPO (where investors generally earn higher 
returns).  Second, we then empirically test between several alternate explanations for this 
 5
overpayment.  Finally, we examine whether, and to what extent, the organizational 
structure of the firm’s CVC program moderates acquisition returns.   
A second set of findings in Chapter 2 reveals that dedicated units are significantly 
less likely to overpay when acquiring portfolio companies than are CVC investors with 
alternative organizational structures.  Moreover, in supplemental analyses, we find that 
dedicated units were also significantly less likely to “throw good money after bad” by 
making follow-on investments in their portfolio companies that ultimately went bankrupt.  
Hence, while this chapter documents that CVC investors frequently invest in startups 
prior to acquiring them (in our sample, they had a prior equity stake in one out of every 
five startups they acquired), it also suggests that such investors may pay a price for 
“trying before they buy,” particularly when the investments originate from product 
groups or business units. 
 The relationship between Chapters 2 and 3 is represented in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.  
Chapter 2 focused on the effect of a prior equity investment if the portfolio firm was 
subsequently acquired.  In Figure 1.4, this relationship corresponds to the impact of the 
prior investment when acquiring portfolio companies a, b, and c.  Chapter 3, in contrast, 
focuses on the broader impact of CVC investments.  In particular, Chapter 3 examines 
whether CVC investing provides information benefits that can “spill over” to affect all 
acquisitions of technology startups that the firm undertakes.  Returning to Figure 1.4 as 
an example, this chapter examines how do the firm’s investments in startups a through e 
affect the returns when the firm acquires startup f?     
The initial motivation for Chapter 3 stemmed in part from the interviews 
conducted for Chapter 2.  One particular interviewee, a manager at a frequent CVC 
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investor, stated, “even if we overpay for some of our [CVC] acquisitions, it is still 
important for us to continue [CVC] investing in order to stay connected to the community 
of VCs and startups.”  Other managers expressed a similar sentiment.  These comments, 
coupled with the empirical observation that CVC investors were good acquirers overall 
(their returns to non-CVC acquisitions were positive and significant), spurred me to 
examine whether information gathered through CVC investing might affect other 
acquisitions that CVC investors make.  The results in Chapter 3 suggest that this is indeed 
the case.  Using a sample of 219 established firms in information technology (IT) 
industries (including firms that do and do not make CVC investments), I find that CVC 
investors are indeed better acquirers, but only in years in which they are actively 
investing in startups.  In contrast, I find no significant differences in acquisition 
performance in years when firms were not making investments.  Similar results emerge 
from analyses that (1) test for differences in performance “between” CVC and non-CVC 
investors, while allowing for non-random selection by firms into corporate venture 
investing, and (2) use a firm fixed- effect specification that utilizes only the “within firm” 
differences among the subset of CVC investors.   Moreover, consistent with the view that 
CVC investing provides an information benefit, these benefits erode quickly and are 
subject to diminishing returns.  Contrary to my expectations, however, I do not find that 
acquisition returns are higher when firms’ portfolio companies are concentrated in the 
same industries as the startups they acquired.  Instead, investments in startups in IT and 
life science industries increase acquisition returns (when acquiring startups in IT) by 
roughly the same magnitude. 
 7
Chapter 4 summarizes the theoretical contribution of this dissertation.  Chapter 4 
also explores the managerial implications of this research, as well as identifies several 
directions for future research.    
 8
Figure 1.1  Number of Corporate Investors, 1980-2003 
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Table 1.1 Summary of Dissertation Essays 
 Chapter 2  Chapter 3  
Research 
Question 
•  How frequently do firms use CVC 
investments to screen potential 
acquisitions? 
 
•  How does a prior CVC investment 
affect the value created (or 
destroyed) in an acquisition? 
 
•  If CVC investors destroy value 
when acquiring portfolio companies, 
what causes this value destruction? 
 
•  Do CVC investments provide 
information benefits that are useful 
when acquiring startups (even for 






H1: Established firms will be more 
likely to overpay when acquiring 
startups in their venture portfolio 
than when acquiring startups 
outright. 
 
H2: This overpayment will be 
mitigated when the initial CVC 
investment originated from a 
dedicated CVC unit (than product 
groups or business units). 
 
H3: Dedicated CVC units will be 
less likely to continue re-investing in 
the subset of startups that ultimately 
fail. 
 
H1: Relative to Non-CVC investors, 
CVC investments will improve 
acquisition performance when 
acquiring startups  
 
 
H2: The beneficial effects of CVC 
investing on acquisition performance 
will dissipate quickly. 
 
H3: As the size of a  firm’s venture 
portfolio increases, the added gains to 
acquisition performance will increase 
at a decreasing rate 
 
H4:  The effects of CVC investing 
will be more pronounced the greater 
the similarity between startups 
invested in and startups acquired. 
Research 
Sample 
• 431 acquisitions of startups, made 
by top 100 CVC investors, 1987-
2003. 
 
• 31 semi-structured interviews with 
corporate venture capitalists, 
independent venture capitalists, and 
entrepreneurs. 
• 529 acquisitions of VC-backed 
startups made by 219 publicly-traded 
companies (both CVC and Non-CVC 
investors) in the IT industry, 1987-
2003. 
 
• 9 interviews with current and former 
CVC managers, in addition to the 31 




A comparison of the returns to CVC 
(e.g. portfolio companies) and Non-
CVC acquisitions (e.g. startups 
acquired outright) made by corporate 
investors. 
 
Compare acquisition performance 
“between“ CVC acquirers and  Non-
CVC acquirers (while allowing for 




 Chapter 2  Chapter 3  
 Use a fixed-effect specification to 
compare acquisition performance 
using only “within firm” variation in 
CVC investing (for subset of CVC 
investors).  
Key Findings • Firms had a prior investment in 
20% of the startups they acquired 
 
• CVC investors are more likely to 
overpay for their CVC acquisitions 
(than startups acquired outright). 
 
• These effects are mitigated when 
the initial investment originates from 
a dedicated CVC unit 
• CVC investments provide 
information affect all acquisitions of 
startups (even absent direct tie) 
 
• The information benefits are subject 
to diminishing returns 
 
• The information benefits of CVC 
investments are short-lived—only  
investments made in the current or 
prior year impact acquisition 
performance 
 
• Investments in both related and 
unrelated portfolio companies 
increase acquisition performance 
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CHAPTER 2 






From 1980 through 2003, established firms invested over $40 billion in 
entrepreneurial ventures (Venture Economics 2005). Like independent venture capitalists, 
corporate investors often seek financial returns through exit events such as initial public 
offerings (IPOs) or sales of portfolio companies to third parties (Gompers and Lerner 
2000a). Corporations also invest for strategic reasons (Hellmann 2002). In surveys, 
managers rate “identifying acquisition opportunities” and the “potential to acquire 
companies” as prominent motives for investing in startups (Siegel et al. 1988; Alter and 
Buchsbaum 2000). 
In principle, the provision of corporate venture capital (CVC) could help 
established firms assess the value of innovative young companies and gain efficiencies 
post-acquisition. Corporate investors commonly provide technical and commercial advice 
to portfolio companies and assume roles on boards of directors (Chesbrough 2002; Maula 
and Murray 2002). By reducing information asymmetries in markets to acquire 
entrepreneurial firms, the provision of venture capital could help corporations mitigate 
the “winner’s curse” of overpayment in the event of subsequent acquisition (Thaler 
1988). Despite survey and case study evidence that CVC investments are used to inform 
entrepreneurial acquisition decisions, little is known about the extent to which CVC 
investors have pre-existing venture ties with startups they acquire. More generally, prior 
studies have not examined whether CVC investors earn positive abnormal returns (net of 
investment and acquisition premiums) when acquiring startups from their portfolios of 
investment companies.  
This paper contributes new evidence based on the returns to top U.S. corporate 
investors when acquiring entrepreneurial firms.5 Integrating acquisitions data with 
information from press releases, news articles, and venture financing databases, we 
distinguish between acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms that are (and are not) CVC 
portfolio companies of their acquirers, which we refer to as “CVC” and “non-CVC” 
acquisitions respectively. In total, we identify 530 entrepreneurial-firm takeovers by 61 
CVC investors during 1987-2003. Of the entrepreneurial targets, 89 (17%) are portfolio 
companies.  
The results of our event study are more surprising. For private takeovers of non-
portfolio companies, we find a significant and positive acquirer return of 0.67% on 
average. This result closely approximates estimates of Moeller et al. (2004) for large 
acquirers of private targets and suggests that established firms in our sample are not 
necessarily “bad acquirers” of startups relative to the larger population of U.S. 
corporations. Indeed, private takeovers of non-portfolio companies created over $32 
billion in shareholder value for these acquirers in 1999 and 2000, a period associated with 
“wealth destruction on a massive scale” in the market for corporate control (Moeller et al. 
2005). 
In sharp contrast, CVC acquisitions tend to destroy value for shareholders of these 
same acquirers. For CVC (portfolio-company) acquisitions, acquirer returns are 
                                                 
5 Targets are classified as “entrepreneurial” or “startups” if they are less than 12 years old when acquired.  
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significant and negative at both mean and median values (-0.97% and -0.75% 
respectively). We find no evidence that this negative market reaction reflects 
disappointment relative to higher payoffs anticipated from the initial investment. 
Moreover, the average return to CVC acquisitions remains more than 1.5% lower than 
the average return to non-CVC acquisitions in multivariate analyses that control for 
detailed characteristics of the acquirers, targets, and deals that could affect the market 
reaction. The results are not driven by “boom years” or outlier observations and remain 
stable across specifications that restrict the sample to matched pairs of CVC and non-
CVC targets and that allow for unobserved heterogeneity among acquirers. On a dollar-
value basis, our estimates suggest that acquiring-firm shareholders gain $8.5 million from 
the median non-CVC acquisition but lose $63 million from the median CVC takeover.  
These findings naturally invite causal explanation: Why would acquisitions of 
portfolio companies destroy value for shareholders of the acquirers? As a first step 
toward investigating this issue, we explore three prominent explanations in the 
acquisitions literature: (1) overbidding due to “owner’s curse”; (2) firm-level governance 
problems; and (3) managerial overconfidence. According to the “owner’s curse” 
hypothesis, investors with a prior equity stake (toehold) may overbid in hopes of 
provoking higher counteroffers (Burkardt 1995; Singh 1998). Assuming that bidders are 
unable to renege on their offers, toehold investors may end up overpaying for some of the 
targets they acquire. A second hypothesis is that firms with weak governance structures 
disproportionately make value-destroying takeovers of portfolio companies. In this view, 
value destruction is rooted in classic agency problems and misaligned incentives (Jensen 
1986). A third hypothesis is managerial “hubris” (Roll 1986) or “overconfidence” 
   19
(Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). In this view, value-destroying CVC acquisitions stem 
from upward biases among managers when valuing portfolio companies.  
Empirically, we find no evidence that the negative market reaction to CVC 
acquisitions is due to competition-driven overbidding (owner’s curse), firm-level 
governance problems, or hubris among CEOs of these investors. Probing deeper, our 
analysis does reveal more favorable outcomes for investors that do (versus do not) house 
CVC programs in autonomous organizational units—both in the value captured from 
portfolio-company acquisitions and in the proclivity to “throw good money after bad” by 
reinvesting in startups that languish. Consistent with overconfidence-based theories, 
managers from dedicated CVC units may be less prone to bias when valuing portfolio 
companies due to greater exposure to investment opportunities (“deal flow”) or superior 
training in finance. Alternatively, organizing CVC activities in standalone units could 
enable superior monitoring and compensation of investment activities, thus helping 
mitigate intra-organizational agency problems. Our conversations with managers point 
toward both explanations.  
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we add to an 
emerging body of research on corporate venture capital and the vehicles used to finance 
entrepreneurial firms. Empirical studies on the returns to CVC investing primarily focus 
on the returns to corporate investors when portfolio companies exit via IPOs or 
acquisitions by third parties (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 2000a). We provide the first 
systematic evidence on how prior venture ties affect the returns to CVC investors as 
acquirers of entrepreneurial firms. Despite recent theoretical attention to the strategic 
nature of CVC investments (Hellmann 2002), empirical research is largely limited to case 
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studies and managerial surveys.6 Within this literature, our study highlights the need for 
additional research on how and why program structure affects CVC financing decisions. 
We also fill a gap in the large literature on factors that influence the value created 
or destroyed from takeover events. Growing evidence shows that acquisitions of private 
companies typically create value for acquiring-firm shareholders (e.g., Fuller et al. 2002; 
Moeller et al. 2004). The influence of preexisting venture ties between acquirers and 
private targets has not been examined in this stream of research. A related body of work 
suggests that use of “pre-acquisition information-gathering mechanisms” such as 
alliances improves the returns to acquirers in the event of subsequent acquisition. Using a 
methodology similar to ours, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) show that purchases by 
pharmaceutical acquirers of former alliance partners create more value for acquiring-firm 
shareholders than do purchases of targets made outright (in their case, without involving 
a prior alliance). Because of its relevance to our study, we discuss the Higgins and 
Rodriguez (2006) article in some detail below. The sharp contrast in our findings 
suggests new lines of inquiry for further study.  
In Section 2 below, we briefly discuss the widespread experimentation in CVC 
investing during the past three decades and review relevant findings from prior studies. 
Section 3 describes the sample, data sources, and methodology and presents our main 
results. In Section 4, we investigate causal explanations for value destruction in CVC 
                                                 
6 In addition to generating returns on investment, CVC can stimulate internal R&D productivity through 
improved management of internal projects (Thornhill and Amit 2000) and information gained from portfolio 
companies (Hellmann 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a, 2005b; Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt 2008). 
As discussed by Chesbrough (2002), investors such as Intel also use corporate venturing to foster the 
development of firms introducing complementary products and services, thus stimulating sales of core products 
without necessitating acquisition. These broader benefits attributed to CVC programs fall beyond the scope of 
our study. 
   21
takeovers and attempt to distinguish among them. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize 
our main findings and discuss their implications for future research.  
 
2.2 Background and Related Studies 
In the late 1970s, regulatory changes in the United States ushered in an era of 
unprecedented investments in startups by both independent venture capitalists and 
established firms (Gompers and Lerner 2000a). According to Venture Economics (2005), 
over 450 corporations ran venture capital programs in 2000 alone. The number of CVC 
investors fluctuates widely over time, however, with one wave of activity in the mid-
1980s (until the 1987 stock market crash) and a more pronounced flurry of activity in the 
mid-to-late 1990s that subsided with the plummet in technology markets. 
Established firms such as Xerox, Johnson and Johnson, and Motorola have long-
standing CVC programs launched in the 1960s. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) show, 
however, that the top 20 CVC investors by 1999—as measured by the dollar-value of 
investments since 1969—is dominated by information technology (IT) firms that initiated 
external venturing programs in the 1990s, including prominent investors such as Intel, 
Cisco Systems, and Microsoft. The over-representation of IT firms among top investors is 
attributed to several related factors, including uncertainty posed by emerging 
technologies during the 1990s, concerns about disruptions in core product markets, and 
corresponding attempts to supplement internal R&D activities with initiatives underway 
at entrepreneurial firms (Maula and Murray 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005b). The 
favorable climate for IPOs and the well-publicized success of startups such as eBay and 
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Yahoo! fueled interest among corporate executives in entrepreneurial financing 
opportunities (Gompers and Lerner 2004). 
2.2.1 Related studies on corporate venture capital  
The most systematic empirical research on corporate venture capital to date 
examines financial metrics common to independent and corporate venture capitalists—
the returns to investments upon exit events such as IPOs or sales of portfolio companies 
to third parties. In general, these studies conclude that corporate investors place at least 
“as good of bets” as independent venture capitalists. Gompers and Lerner (2000a) 
provide the most comprehensive evidence by examining over 30,000 investments 
between 1983 and 1994 and tracing the status of recipient companies by the spring of 
1998. The study finds that, for investments in related sectors, corporate investors are at 
least as successful as independent VCs, as measured by the probability of a portfolio 
company going public or being acquired for more than twice the value of the initial 
investment. Similar evidence is reported in sector-specific studies. Stuart et al. (1999) 
examine the IPOs of 301 venture-backed biotechnology firms during 1978-1991 and find 
that startups with prominent corporate investors launch IPOs more quickly and with 
higher valuations than startups lacking such ties. More recently, Maula and Murray 
(2002) examine 325 IT firms with IPOs in 1998 and 1999 and show that CVC-backed 
startups have higher market valuations than those financed by independent VCs alone.  
By comparison, evidence on acquisitions of portfolio companies is largely 
confined to surveys of managerial motives (discussed earlier) and case studies of 
individual CVC programs. Dyer et al. (2004), for example, conduct interviews with 
managers at Cisco Systems and examine the company’s history of acquisitions and 
   23
alliances. According to the authors, Cisco managers use venture funds to “evaluate firms 
to determine if acquisitions will work,” thus enabling them to make more informed 
acquisition decisions (Dyer et al. 2004, p. 8).7 The authors report that Cisco had prior 
venture ties with one of every four companies it acquired through 2003. Other corporate 
investors appear to pursue a similar approach. The director of Siemen’s venture arm is 
reported to view “every investment as a potential acquisition” (Wieland 2005, p.1.). 
According to another report, Motorola acquired three of the five startups sold from its 
venture portfolio in 2004 (Loizos 2005). Contrasting approaches nonetheless exist within 
the IT sector, with Dell and Nokia focusing narrowly on financial returns and reporting 
little intent to acquire portfolio companies (Loizos 2005; Wieland 2005). While 
anecdotes exist, systematic evidence on the extent to which CVC investors have venture 
ties with startups they acquire remains lacking. More important, prior studies have not 
established whether takeovers of portfolio companies create (or destroy) value for 
shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors.  
2.2.2 Related studies on acquisitions 
In estimating acquirer returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions, our study also 
builds on a large body of work in corporate finance and strategy on the effects of 
restructuring events on shareholder value. Andrade et al. (2001) review this extensive 
literature. Within the acquisitions literature, three strands of research are particularly 
relevant, including studies on (1) the returns to acquirers of private companies; (2) the 
                                                 
7 Managers interviewed further estimate that it takes around 12 to 18 months to “build trust with partners and 
decide if the companies can work together” (Dyer et al. 2004, p. 8). For example, Cisco worked with one of its 
portfolio companies, NETSYS Technologies, for 20 months before acquiring the firm in 1996 for its network 
infrastructure and software technologies. We find relationships of similar duration between corporate investors 
and acquired portfolio companies in our sample, with a median lag of 16 months between the initial investment 
and the subsequent acquisition announcement. 
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impact of pre-acquisition alliances on acquirer returns; and (3) the use and effects of 
toehold investments in takeover contests.  
In contrast to the negative or insignificant acquirer returns from purchases of 
firms that are publicly traded, a growing body of evidence shows that acquiring-firm 
shareholders tend to earn positive abnormal returns from takeovers of private companies 
(Andrade et al. 2001; Moeller et al. 2004). Using a sample of 281 private firms acquired 
during 1981-1992, Chang (1998) reports a 2.6% abnormal return when stock is used to 
finance the deal. More recent studies report positive returns to acquirers of private targets 
regardless of financing method. Based on 3,135 takeovers made by frequent acquirers 
during 1990-2001, Fuller et al. (2002) report significant positive acquirer returns in 
purchases of private firms (2.1% on average) but significant negative returns when the 
same acquirers purchase public companies (-1.0% on average). In a more comprehensive 
study of deals announced during 1980-2001, Moeller et al. (2004) show a significant 
0.7% return to large U.S. acquirers of private firms, the subset that most closely parallels 
the empirical context of our study. These studies do not examine the effect of prior 
venture ties between acquirers and targets and rely on SDC data for information on 
ownership stakes in targets. As shown below, we find significant underreporting by SDC 
of prior venture ties between acquirers and entrepreneurial targets in our sample.  
A separate line of research focuses more narrowly on acquisitions of former 
alliance partners, albeit primarily in the context of non-equity alliances between public 
companies. Building on earlier work by Chan et al. (1997), Higgins and Rodriguez 
(2006) examine 160 acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry during 1994-2001, of 
which 45 (28%) involve former alliance partners. On average, pharmaceutical acquirers 
   25
in their sample had four prior agreements, broadly defined as R&D, distribution, or 
marketing agreements, with partners they acquired during the period of study. Despite the 
fact that acquisitions between repeat alliance partners may be anticipated, at least 
partially, by the market, Higgins and Rodriguez find that the market responds more 
favorably when acquisitions of former alliance partners are announced than when targets 
are acquired outright—in their case, without a prior alliance. The authors argue that “pre-
acquisition information gathering mechanisms” such as alliances reduce the likelihood 
that acquirers overpay in the event of subsequent acquisition and increase potential 
synergies from the deal. As suggested earlier, similar benefits should arise, at least in 
principle, through the provision of corporate venture capital.  
A third set of acquisitions studies examines the use of minority equity investments 
in takeover contests, albeit solely in the context of public firms. As reviewed by Betton et 
al. (2009), toehold positions in public targets can deter competition, decrease managerial 
resistance, increase bidders’ chances of winning takeover battles, and/or reduce 
premiums paid in the event of an acquisition. Nonetheless, others show that toehold 
investors may have incentives to bid aggressively, even overbid, given a positive 
probability of provoking a higher counteroffer (Burkart 1995; Singh 1998). Assuming 
that bidders cannot renege on their offers, toehold investors therefore may end up 
rationally overpaying for some of the firms they acquire, an effect referred to as owner’s 
curse since overpayment arises because of the prior ownership stake. Empirical evidence 
of owner’s curse remains inconclusive even among takeovers of public targets (e.g., 
Mikkelson and Ruback 1985; Betton and Eckbo 2000). The extent to which toeholds 
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affect the returns to acquirers of entrepreneurial firms remains an open empirical 
question.8 
 
2.3 Announcement Returns for CVC and non-CVC Acquisitions 
2.3.1 Compiling the sample 
To investigate the returns to CVC investors from acquiring portfolio and non-
portfolio companies, we assembled data from a variety of public and private sources. The 
acquiring-firm sample was drawn from the top 100 publicly traded U.S. corporations with 
direct VC investments during 1980-2003, based on the total count of startups in their 
investment portfolios as listed in Venture Economics. Rank-ordering firms by the dollar 
value of investments produced a similar list. From these top 100 CVC investors, we 
chose the subset that acquired at least one entrepreneurial firm between 1987 and 2003, 
irrespective of whether the startup was a portfolio company. This filter eliminated 
financial investors (such as Comdisco Holding Company) that did not participate in 
entrepreneurial takeover markets. As listed in the Appendix, information about 
acquisitions made by CVC investors was obtained from multiple sources, including the 
SDC Merger and Acquisitions database, the CorpTech business directory, press releases, 
news articles, and two leading venture finance databases, VentureOne and Venture 
Economics.  
                                                 
8As discussed by Bulow et al. (1999), predictions from formal models on toeholds rest on assumptions 
regarding the disclosure and size of ownership stakes, the private or common value of the bidders, and 
constraints on the subsequent reneging of offers. Since takeovers of private firms face less stringent disclosure 
and reporting requirements, predictions from the toeholds literature may not generalize to private-target 
settings. For example, the Williams Act of 1970 requires disclosure to the SEC (though 13-D filings) of 
ownership stakes greater than 5% in public firms. In contrast, investors currently are not required to disclose 
minority equity stakes in firms that are private. Similarly, bidders for public targets must refrain from 
withdrawing tender offers during a 20-day period, whereas acquisitions for private firms typically are made 
through private auctions or bilateral negotiations (Graebner and Eisenhardt 2004) that are not subject to this 
regulatory requirement. 
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To identify takeovers of “entrepreneurial firms,” we selected the subset of targets 
that were 12 years old or younger in the year of acquisition, measured by the acquisition 
year minus the founding year of the firm. Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) similarly 
categorize startups as firms less than 11 years old based on years since founding. We 
experimented with more restrictive target criteria, including age cut-offs at 10 years and 
maximum sizes of 500 and 1,000 employees, and obtained similar results. To identify the 
existence (if any) of an acquirer’s VC investment in an entrepreneurial-firm target, we 
hand-collected data from VentureOne, Venture Economics, news articles, and press 
releases. This process yielded 530 entrepreneurial-firm acquisitions by 61 corporate 
investors between 1987 and 2003. Of these entrepreneurial targets, 89 were portfolio 
companies of their acquirers (CVC acquisitions) while 441 were not (non-CVC 
acquisitions). In only six (7%) of the 89 CVC acquisitions was the acquirer’s equity 
ownership stake listed in SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database, the main source of 
data used in prior studies of acquisitions. For the remaining 83 cases, SDC failed to 
report the acquirer’s prior VC ownership stake in the target. 
Table 1 lists CVC and non-CVC acquisitions in the sample by year and for IT 
acquirers. As seen in Table 1, acquisition types are distributed similarly in time. In both 
cases, the largest share occurred in the merger wave of the late 1990s. Overall, 76% of 
the takeovers are by IT firms, which is not surprising given the overrepresentation of the 
IT sector among top CVC investors mentioned earlier. 
2.3.2 The gains to acquiring-firm shareholders: univariate results 
     To estimate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) upon announcement of 
CVC and non-CVC acquisitions, we use a standard event study methodology. 
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Acquisition dates were compiled from SDC and VentureOne and verified using articles in 
The Wall Street Journal. The results reported are based on a two-day event window (-
1,0), a 250-day estimation period ending on day -11 (-260, -11), and the CRSP value-
weighted index. Following Brown and Warner (1985), p-values are corrected for serial 
correlation during the event window. We obtain similar estimates using a three-day event 
window (-1,+1), a 180-day estimation period (-190, -11), and the CRSP equal-weighted 
index.9 Of the 530 entrepreneurial acquisitions, we eliminated 41 observations (15 CVC 
and 26 non-CVC) due to simultaneous takeovers of the acquirer or major unrelated news 
announcements in the event window (e.g., regarding the filing or settlement of a lawsuit 
or unexpected earnings announcements).10 Our estimation sample therefore includes 489 
announcements of 74 CVC and 415 non-CVC acquisitions. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 present the average abnormal returns to shareholders 
of these corporate investors for non-CVC and CVC acquisitions respectively. Differences 
in acquirer returns are reported in Column 3. Panel A reports results for the full sample of 
private and public targets. Panel B restricts the sample to private targets. Only 3 of the 74 
CVC acquisitions (4%) involved public targets whereas 77 of the 415 startups purchased 
outright (19%) were publicly traded when acquired. As discussed earlier, prior studies 
show that target ownership status is a significant predictor of acquirer returns (e.g., Fuller 
et al. 2002). We therefore report results separately for private targets in Tables 2 and 3 
and treat public and private targets separately in all regressions. 
                                                 
9 In reviews of event studies, MacKinlay (1997) and McWilliams and Siegel (1997) recommend using short 
time windows, both to maximize the power of the statistical tests and to minimize the likelihood of confounding 
events. Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Chang (1998), and Song and Walkling (2000) are examples of studies 
that use a two-day window. Andrade et al. (2001), Moeller et al. (2004) and Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) use 
a three-day window. 
10 Mean and median values of characteristics for CVC acquisitions included in the estimation sample are 
statistically indistinguishable from those omitted due to confounding news announcements.  
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As shown in Column 1 of Table 2, the estimated abnormal acquirer return is 
0.37% on average for the full sample of non-CVC acquisitions and 0.67% for the subset 
involving private targets. The latter estimate approximates the 0.70% average return 
reported by Moeller et al. (2004) for large acquirers of private companies during 1980-
2001 but is smaller in magnitude than the 2% reported by Fuller et al. (2002) for frequent 
acquirers of private targets in the 1990s.  
In sharp contrast, Column 2 in Table 2 reveals that the average abnormal return to 
CVC acquisition announcements is negative and statistically significant. The average 
abnormal return to CVC acquisitions is -0.97% for the full sample in Panel A and is -
1.05% for the subset of private targets in Panel B. In both samples, the median return to 
CVC acquisition announcements also is negative and significant at the 5% level. The 
return to CVC acquisition announcements is significantly different than the returns to 
non-CVC acquisitions for the full sample (1.33% lower) and subset of private targets 
(1.72% lower) respectively, as shown in Column 3.  
On a dollar-value basis, these estimates suggest that the median non-CVC 
acquisition creates $8.5 million in value for shareholders of these acquirers whereas the 
median CVC acquisition destroys $63 million in shareholder value for these same 
acquirers upon announcement of the deal. In Panel B, the gap in returns widens further. 
For takeovers of private targets, the median non-CVC acquisition creates $18.7 million in 
value for acquiring-firm shareholders. In contrast, the median takeover of a private 
portfolio company destroys -$70.2 million in value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC 
investors. 
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Table 3 sub-divides acquirer returns and aggregate wealth effects into deals 
announced before, during, and after the boom years of 1999 and 2000. In investigating 
the “era of massive value destruction,” Moeller et al. (2005) conclude that the value 
destroyed by the recent merger wave was driven by large takeovers of public targets. A 
similar pattern emerges for non-CVC acquisitions in our sample. Of the 135 non-CVC 
acquisitions made in 1999 and 2000, only 21 involved startups that were publicly traded. 
Nonetheless, inclusion of public targets swings the estimated dollar returns for non-CVC 
acquisitions from $32 billion in aggregate gains (for the subset of deals involving private 
targets in Panel B for the 1999-2000 period) to $13.8 billion in aggregate losses in the 
same sub-period. 
Of particular importance, Table 3 also reveals consistent divergence across sub-
periods in the returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions. For the subset of private 
startups acquired outright (Column 2, Panel B), the mean acquirer return hovers around 
the 0.67% average in each sub-period. In contrast, the average return to CVC acquisitions 
remains negative across sub-periods, as shown in Column 5. Interestingly, the market 
reaction to CVC acquisitions is more favorable on average (but still negative at -0.70%) 
in the boom period. These trends provide little indication that value-destroying CVC 
takeovers are rooted in market dynamics unique to the recent boom period.  
2.3.3 Do CVC acquisition announcements represent disappointing news? 
A natural concern when interpreting these statistics is that non-CVC acquisition 
announcements reveal unexpected news (potentially providing more reliable estimates of 
the value anticipated from the deals) while CVC acquisitions could be anticipated due to 
information previously disclosed about the minority equity investment. If CVC 
   31
acquisitions are fully anticipated by the market, however, we would expect an 
insignificant response—not the significant and negative reaction we observe. Moreover, 
as discussed earlier, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) report a more favorable market 
response when acquisitions of former alliance partners are announced, albeit in the 
context of pharmaceuticals and for a broader range of pre-acquisition alliances. 
When investing venture funds, however, there is a positive initial probability that 
a portfolio company will go public, an event that typically yields the highest returns for 
investors (Gompers and Lerner 2000a; 2004). As suggested earlier, prior studies find that 
startups with prominent CVC investors launch IPOs more quickly and with higher 
valuations than startups lacking such ties (Stuart et al. 1999). When a CVC acquisition is 
announced, the possibility of an IPO exit is eliminated. The negative reaction to CVC 
acquisition announcements therefore could represent a downward adjustment of payoffs 
initially anticipated from the equity investment (i.e., a market correction) rather than 
overpayment in the focal deal. 
We test for possible disappointment in several ways. First, we compare the market 
reaction to CVC acquisitions where the venture tie is (versus is not) disclosed through a 
press release or news article prior to the acquisition announcement. For 50 of the CVC 
acquisitions (68%), the initial funding relationship between the acquirer and startup is 
announced prior to the acquisition announcement, typically through a press release issued 
by the startup. For the remaining 24 CVC acquisitions (32%), the venture tie is first 
announced to the public in the acquisition announcement. In supplemental analyses 
(available upon request), portfolio companies with identifiable media coverage pre-
acquisition attracted more private equity investors and had a greater number of 
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employees when acquired relative to portfolio companies lacking media coverage. 
Assuming that “newsworthiness” correlates with profit anticipated from the initial CVC 
investment, investor disappointment should be greater for the subset of CVC acquisitions 
with prior media disclosure. Similarly, we should expect a downward correction of 
greater magnitude for disclosed (versus undisclosed) CVC acquisitions if market analysts 
fail to learn about undisclosed deals through non-media channels. At odds with either 
view, Panel A in Table 4 reveals a negative reaction of greater magnitude when prior 
funding is not disclosed prior to acquisition. 
If our results are due to disappointment, we also should expect the negative 
reaction to CVC acquisition announcements to be preceded by a positive reaction upon 
disclosure of the initial CVC investment. For the 50 observations in which the initial 
CVC funds are clearly revealed pre-acquisition, however, Panel B of Table 4 shows that 
the market reaction also is negative upon announcement of the initial venture investment 
(-0.52%).11 In contrast, Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) find a two-day acquirer return of 
1.17% upon disclosure of toeholds in public firms.  
As a final test, we estimate the abnormal returns upon announcement of CVC 
acquisitions to non-acquiring corporate investors in the entrepreneurial target. If the 
negative response to CVC acquisitions reflects disappointment due to the failure to 
launch an IPO, we should similarly observe a negative return to other corporate investors 
upon the acquisition announcement. Alternatively, a positive return to other corporate 
owners is consistent with overpayment by the acquirer and a transfer of wealth to the 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, in supplemental analyses, the market response to all initial CVC investments made by these 
frequent investors (regardless of the venture’s final outcome) also was negative yet statistically insignificant at 
mean and median values. 
   33
other equity owners. As reported in Panel C of Table 4, we find a positive abnormal 
return of 0.99% to non-acquiring CVC investors.  
In each of these tests, we face inherent limitations due to small sample sizes once 
restrictions are placed on the subset of CVC acquisitions. In combination, however, the 
evidence is consistently at odds with the disappointment explanation.   
2.3.4. Acquirer, target, and other deal characteristics: CVC vs. non-CVC acquisitions 
A separate concern when interpreting abnormal return statistics is that the market 
response reflects updated investor expectations about the acquiring firm’s value for 
reasons unrelated to the particular deal. Prior studies show, for example, that acquirers 
experience a lower abnormal return when they purchase companies with stock (e.g. 
Travlos 1987). Although this effect does not seem to hold when private targets are 
acquired (Fuller et al. 2002; Moeller et al. 2004), acquisitions paid for with equity may 
signal to the market that the acquiring firm’s stock is overvalued. If acquirers use stock to 
purchase CVC targets but pay for non-CVC targets with cash, we could observe lower 
returns to CVC acquisition announcements for reasons unrelated to value expected from 
focal deals. 
Numerous factors can affect the stock market reaction to acquisition 
announcements. Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) report that firms with a low 
market-to-book (Tobin’s q) ratio have lower announcement returns than do high q 
bidders, possibly driven by concerns about exhaustion of internal growth opportunities. 
Using more comprehensive data, however, Moeller et al. (2004) find that q is an 
insignificant determinant of acquirer returns in takeovers announced in the 1990s. 
Instead, they report a significant size effect and show that the market responds more 
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negatively to deals made by large firms relative to smaller-firm acquirers. The market 
reaction also can hinge on the free cash flow available to acquiring-firm managers 
(Jensen 1986), the size of the target relative to the acquirer (Fuller et al. 2002), and 
acquirer R&D spending (Higgins and Rodriguez 2006). Finally, the market could respond 
more negatively to announcements made by IT acquirers given sector-specific concerns 
of overvalued stock (Perkins and Perkins 1999; Shiller 2000). 
Transaction values (and correspondingly, acquirer returns) also can be affected by 
the degree of competition in takeover markets and, for startups, the opportunity costs of 
foregoing an IPO exit. Following Schlingemann et al. (2002), we therefore compiled a 
“Liquidity Index” to proxy for the degree of competition in takeover markets, by dividing 
the value of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announced in the target sector by the book 
value of assets in that sector. As Moeller et al. (2004) report, firms may offer higher 
premiums to potential targets in more active takeover markets to deter rival bids. In this 
case, acquisition premiums may be elevated even if multiple bids are not observed. Since 
the identities of bidders for private companies are rarely made public, the liquidity index 
is a useful proxy for competition that otherwise would be difficult to discern. As a 
robustness check, we divided M&A activity by the market value of firms in the sector 
instead and obtained similar results.  
To capture IPO conditions, we tallied the number of IPOs in the target sector. 
(Alternative proxies using the dollar value of IPOs in the target sector and the quarterly 
NASDAQ index were highly correlated and generated similar results.) In unfavorable 
IPO environments, acquirers may provide a liquidity service to entrepreneurs and venture 
investors, thus increasing the likelihood of reaping gains from the deal. To allow 
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volatility in annual market conditions, the Liquidity Index and IPO counts are computed 
in the quarter of the focal acquisition announcement. 
Table 5 reports summary statistics of acquirer, target, and deal characteristics by 
acquisition type (CVC and non-CVC) and for the pooled sample. Variable definitions and 
data sources are listed in the Appendix. Among top CVC investors, Panel A shows that 
those making non-CVC acquisitions are similar to those that acquire portfolio companies. 
In both cases, acquirers are large R&D-intensive firms with high market-to-book ratios. 
The distribution of deals made by IT firms is similar, at 77% and 76% for non-CVC and 
CVC acquisitions respectively. Panels B and C show that both non-CVC and CVC targets 
are small relative to acquirers, are similarly likely to own patents (an indicator of 
technological maturity and target bargaining power), and with rare exception are 
developing products that relate directly to existing businesses of the acquirer. While stock 
is used to finance a higher share of CVC acquisitions (70% vs. 67% for non-CVC 
takeovers), the difference is statistically insignificant.  
The method of payment is not reported for 37% of the CVC acquisitions and 41% 
of non-CVC acquisitions. Similarly, transaction values are not disclosed for 26% and 
32% of CVC and non-CVC acquisitions respectively. A recent study by Rodrigues and 
Stegemoller (2007) shows that SEC requirements failed to require disclosure of 
information pertaining to many value-relevant private-target takeovers over the past two 
decades. We therefore include observations with unreported deal values or payment 
methods in the estimation sample but treat them separately in regressions that follow with 
the Deal Terms Undisclosed indicator variable. Similar results are obtained if 
observations with missing terms or prices are removed from the sample. 
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The main differences revealed in Table 5 pertain to target-firm and environmental 
characteristics. As seen in Panel C, CVC targets tend to be younger and smaller than non-
CVC targets. The median CVC target is 4 years old and has 60 employees whereas the 
median non-CVC target is older (5 years) and larger (77 employees) when acquired. 
While 19% of the non-CVC targets are public, CVC acquisitions—with rare exception—
occur pre-IPO. Relative to their non-CVC counterparts, CVC acquisitions also tend to 
occur in less favorable IPO and takeover environments. If corporate investors perform a 
liquidity service by acquiring portfolio companies in periods with less attractive exit 
options, we should expect positive (or insignificant) acquirer returns rather than the 
negative returns shown earlier. Our event study results are even more perplexing in light 
of these statistics.  
2.3.5 Multivariate regressions 
This section investigates more formally whether the difference in acquirer returns 
to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions stems from other characteristics of the acquirers, 
targets, or deals that could affect the market reaction. Table 6 reports OLS estimates of 
two-day abnormal acquirer returns with acquirer-clustered robust standard errors. Annual 
time dummies are included in each specification.  
Column 1 of Table 6 provides baseline estimates. In line with findings from prior 
studies, acquirer returns are significantly lower in takeovers of public targets. Acquirer 
returns also are lower on average in the IT sector and for deals with undisclosed deal 
terms or prices. Insignificant predictors on other variables could reflect our relatively 
homogenous sample of large, R&D-intensive acquirers.  
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Column 2 introduces the CVC Acquisition indicator variable. In univariate results 
shown earlier (Table 2), the average acquirer return to CVC acquisitions is 1.33% lower 
than that for non-CVC acquisitions. In Table 6, the gap in returns grows even wider 
(exceeding 1.5%) once we control for observable acquirer, deal, and target 
characteristics. In diagnostic analyses (available on request), we obtain similar results in 
regressions that (a) omit outlier observations at top and bottom 1% values, (b) restrict the 
sample to takeovers with known payment methods and deal values, (c) allow differential 
effects for larger (versus smaller) targets, and (d) replace year dummies with period 
categories defined in Table 3. 
Columns 3-6 provide additional robustness checks. First, we explore whether the 
divergent returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions stem from differences in the types of 
entrepreneurial firms selected for initial funding and subsequent purchase. To investigate 
this possibility, we impose tighter restrictions on observable characteristics of targets by 
limiting the sample to venture-backed private targets (in Column 3) and to matched pairs 
of CVC and non-CVC targets (in Column 4). For the one-to-one matched sample, we 
select VC-backed private firms then match each CVC target with the non-CVC target that 
is (a) closest by date of acquisition announcement, irrespective of acquirer identity and 
(b) classified in the same Venture One product segment. Although VentureOne does not 
use numeric codes, the business sectors correspond roughly to 4-digit SIC codes. For 
example, “prepackaged software” (sic 7372) is distinguished from “systems software” 
(sic7371). If a suitable match is unidentified within two years of the CVC target’s 
acquisition date, the focal target is removed from the sample. Using these criteria, 65 of 
the 74 CVC targets match to 65 corresponding non-CVC targets. As shown in Columns 3 
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and 4 in Table 6, the gap in returns remains similar or greater in magnitude after 
imposing these restrictions on the target-firm sample. 
A separate concern is that the divergent return to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions 
is due to unobserved heterogeneity among acquirers that is insufficiently captured by the 
right-hand-side variables. In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6, we allow for this possibility by 
using an acquirer-specific fixed effects specification. Column 5 uses the full estimation 
sample. Column 6 restricts the sample to corporate investors that make acquisitions of 
both types (CVC and non-CVC). These specifications are similar to those used in the 
Fuller et al. (2002) study of returns to frequent acquirers; they enable us to test for 
“within acquirer” differences in returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions. As shown in 
Columns 5 and 6, the gap in acquirer returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisition 
announcements narrows slightly to 1.5% but remains negative and significant in each 
specification.  
 
2.4 Why would portfolio-company takeovers destroy value for shareholders of 
acquirers? 
 
This section seeks to unravel these otherwise puzzling findings: Why would 
takeovers of portfolio companies systematically destroy value for shareholders of 
acquisitive CVC investors? This question is particularly intriguing since these same CVC 
investors otherwise are “good acquirers” of entrepreneurial firms. We investigate three 
explanations that figure prominently in the acquisitions literature: (1) competition-
induced overbidding (owner’s curse); (2) firm-level governance problems; and (3) 
managerial overconfidence. To gain additional insights, we also spoke with managers 
involved in corporate venturing programs either directly (as current or former directors of 
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programs) or indirectly through involvement with portfolio companies.12 Below, we 
report results from our empirical analyses then turn to alternative explanations and 
interview insights.  
2.4.1. Owner’s curse 
A central insight from models of owner’s curse discussed earlier is that minority 
equity owners may bid aggressively, even overbid, in expectation of triggering higher 
counteroffers (Burkart 1995; Singh 1998). Assuming that bidders are unable to renege on 
their offers, toehold investors may end up overpaying for some companies. In this view, 
overpayment is fueled by competition in takeover markets and anticipation of 
counteroffers.  
To test the owner’s curse hypothesis, we interact CVC acquisition with a variety 
of indicators for competitive market conditions. First, we compute the total number of 
corporate investors in the focal target, which represent potential rival bidders. Second, we 
measure the intensity of M&A activity in the target sector more generally by using the 
Liquidity Index defined earlier. This index is a particularly useful proxy for competition 
in these takeover markets since failed bids for private companies rarely are made public. 
Third, we compute the number of IPOs in the target sector, since higher counteroffers 
may be easier to provoke in favorable IPO environments.  
Table 7 reports the results of this analysis. If owner’s curse explains the negative 
returns to CVC acquisitions, we should observe negative and significant effects when 
interacting CVC Acquisition with indicators of competitive market conditions. At odds 
                                                 
12 In 2005-2007, we met informally with 31 individuals involved in corporate venture finance primarily within 
the IT sector. Early meetings were open-ended; later meetings were semi-structured and used interview 
templates. Our objective was to obtain general insights about the CVC and entrepreneurial-firm acquisition 
experiences of these managers.  
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with this view, each interaction effect in Columns 3-5 of Table 7 is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
2.4.2. Firm-level governance problems 
A common criticism launched against corporate venturing programs is their use to 
fund CEO “pet projects” (Gompers and Lerner 2000a; Loizos 2005). It is reasonable to 
question therefore whether firms with weak corporate governance structures 
disproportionately make value-destroying takeovers of portfolio companies. In this view, 
value destruction stems from agency problems long studied by finance and strategy 
scholars. 
To investigate this possibility, we compiled time-varying measures of governance 
quality using indices developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM 2003) and 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (BCF 2009). The GIM Index tabulates 24 provisions that 
protect shareholder rights, as reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC). The BCF Index is derived from a sub-set of six provisions that, according to 
Bebchuk et al. (2009), yield greater explanatory precision when predicting firm value and 
shareholder returns.13 In both cases, higher scores are used to proxy for greater 
managerial entrenchment. In turn, lower scores indicate superior governance quality. 
Table 8 compares the mean and median governance scores of corporate investors 
in our sample with those reported for the larger population of 1,500 public U.S. 
corporations tracked by the IRRC. As shown in Columns 1 and 2, the governance quality 
of top corporate investors is comparable to that of other public U.S. corporations. The 
only significant difference pertains to median values of the BCF Index, which indicates 
                                                 
13 The six provisions are (1) staggered boards, (2) limits to shareholder by-law amendments, (3) supermajority 
requirements for mergers, (4) supermajority requirements for charter amendments, (5) poison pills, and (6) 
golden parachutes.  
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superior governance quality (lower scores) for CVC investors. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 
8 report within-sample scores by acquisition type (CVC or non-CVC). If firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms disproportionately acquire portfolio companies, we 
should expect lower governance quality (higher scores) in CVC acquisitions. Columns 3 
and 4, however, reveal no discernable difference in governance scores between the 
groups. 
Results from multivariate regressions in Table 9 corroborate these descriptive 
statistics. Again, there is little indication that value destruction in CVC acquisitions stems 
from firm-level governance problems, whether measured indirectly by traditional 
measures like free cash flow (Column 2) or by more direct proxies for governance quality 
(in Columns 3-4). For sake of brevity, we report results in Table 9 using the BCF Index. 
Similar results were obtained with the GIM Index. When interpreting these findings, it is 
important to acknowledge that the BCF and GIM indices may fail to discern 
heterogeneity among investors in program-level agency problems, a possibility that we 
return to in Section 4.4. In combination, however, evidence from Tables 8 and 9 suggests 
that the negative return to CVC acquisitions stems from factors other than governance 
problems at top levels of these firms.  
2.4.3. Managerial overconfidence 
A third explanation for value destruction in portfolio-company acquisitions is 
managerial overconfidence. Overconfidence is generally defined as “the tendency to 
overestimate one’s own (relative) abilities and resulting outcomes” (Camerer and 
Malmendier 2007, p. 14). In this view, managers may seek to maximize shareholder 
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value when acquiring portfolio companies yet may nonetheless fail to do so due to 
upward biases when forecasting the value anticipated from the deals. 
Building on pioneering work by Roll (1986), the acquisitions literature largely 
casts overconfidence as an individual-specific personality trait. Estimating the degree of 
overconfidence among individual CEOs, for example, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) 
and Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that firms led by hubristic CEOs are more prone 
to overpay in takeover markets than are firms with less hubristic leaders.  
A separate strand of behavioral research attributes the degree of overconfidence 
bias to an individual’s exposure to representative baselines of comparison, or “outside” 
views through which to frame and calibrate expectations.14 Following influential work by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), evidence from experiments (Camerer and Lovallo 1999; 
Kahneman and Lovallo 1993) and case studies of technology development programs 
(e.g., Garud and Ahlstrom 1997) indicates that individuals lacking exposure to such 
“base-rates” of comparison are more prone to upward bias when estimating outcomes of 
uncertain projects, particularly when they are personally committed to the decision. In 
related work, Cooper et al. (1988) and Landier and Thesmar (2009) show that 
entrepreneurs systematically inflate estimates of their own firm’s success, particularly 
when they are founders or key inventors. Similarly, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) 
find that CEOs with technical backgrounds exhibit greater overconfidence when 
assessing the returns to investments than CEOs with finance backgrounds, possibly due 
to differential levels of personal commitment to the projects. 
                                                 
14 As Camerer and Lovallo (1999, p. 315) explain, “[a]n outside view ignores special details of the case at 
hand, constructs a class of cases similar to the current one, and guesses where the current case is in that class. 
[In contrast], an inside view forecast is generated by focusing on the abilities and resources of a particular 
group, constructing scenarios of future progress, and extrapolating current trends.” Put differently, “[t]he 
inside view tells a colorful story; the outside view recites statistics” (Camerer and Lovallo 1999, p. 315). 
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Building on insights from these studies, we undertake two sets of analyses. First, 
we explore whether firms making value-destroying CVC acquisitions are managed by 
more hubristic CEOs. Second, we identify organizational contexts likely to yield varying 
degrees of overconfidence among managers responsible for CVC investing and test for 
differential effects on investment performance.  
CEO-level hubris. To investigate CEO-level hubris, we assembled the names of 
all CEOs of the 61 investors from annual 10-k filings and re-ran the abnormal returns 
analysis with a CEO-specific fixed effects specification. This approach allows CEOs to 
vary in time-invariant ways (e.g., hubristic personalities or finance backgrounds) that 
might alter the returns to acquiring portfolio companies. The results are reported in Table 
10. As Column 2 shows, we continue to find a large and significant “within CEO” gap in 
the returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions with this more stringent specification. 
These findings suggest that, if managerial overconfidence leads to value-destroying 
takeovers in the context of our study, it resides deeper within these organizations.  
Program Structure and Degree of Overconfidence Bias. Our second test for 
overconfidence-related bias exploits differences among firms in the internal organization 
of CVC programs. Prior studies suggest that firms find it easier to attract managers with 
backgrounds in finance or private equity investing by organizing CVC programs in 
autonomous subsidiaries or units (Siegel et al. 1988; Hill and Birkinshaw 2008). Doing 
so not only enables firms to offer responsibility for a broader array of investment projects 
but also increases the visibility of the program.15 Others suggest that housing CVC 
                                                 
15 In a study of organizational structures used to manage strategic alliances, Kale et al. (2002) similarly note that 
the creation of a dedicated alliance group increases the visibility of the program to employees and external 
parties. The authors do not discuss, however, whether the dedicated alliance structure enables firms to attract 
more qualified managers. 
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programs in dedicated units reduces expropriation risks for startups seeking funding 
(Dushnitsky and Shaver 2009), thus facilitating a broader “deal flow” of investment 
opportunities. If managers from dedicated CVC units are less involved in technological 
aspects of the projects yet gain exposure to more representative baselines of comparison, 
they may be less vulnerable than managers from less systematized programs to 
overconfidence bias when valuing portfolio companies.  
An ideal test for overconfidence bias among lower-level managers would use 
proprietary data (unavailable to us) on the identities of individuals responsible for 
funding and/or acquiring portfolio companies, their exposure to deal flow, and their 
educational backgrounds. Absent that, our empirical strategy rests on the assumption that 
the degree of overconfidence bias among CVC managers varies systematically with 
program structure, with lower levels exhibited by managers from dedicated units. This 
approach is similar to that used by Barber and Odean (2001), where the (unobserved) 
degree of bias is assumed to correlate systematically with the (observed) gender of 
investors.  
Program Structure and Returns to Acquiring Portfolio Companies. If managers 
from dedicated CVC units are less prone to judgment bias when valuing portfolio 
companies, they should capture higher returns when acquiring portfolio companies than 
managers from less systematized programs. To explore this possibility, we categorize 
structure type based on investor names reported in VentureOne and create a new variable, 
Dedicated CVC unit, which equals 1 if a dedicated organizational unit (like Motorola 
Ventures or Intel Capital) is listed; else it is set to zero. Of the 61 corporate investors in 
our sample, 35 (57%) made investments through autonomous CVC units while 26 (43%) 
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did not.16 Of the 74 acquired portfolio companies, however, only 17 (23%) received 
initial backing from a dedicated CVC unit; the remainder (77%) received initial financing 
from product groups or other corporate departments.  
Consistent with the view that program structure correlates with the degree of 
overconfidence bias among CVC investors, Table 10 shows that the average return for 
portfolio-company acquisitions is significantly higher when managers from dedicated 
CVC units are responsible for the initial funding decision. As shown in Columns 3, the 
coefficient on the interaction term, CVC acquisition * Dedicated CVC unit, is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. In Columns 4-6, we obtain similar results even controlling 
for differences among firms in CVC investment experience (Column 4), acquisition 
experience (Column 5), and governance quality (Column 6). Using the coefficients from 
Column 6, these estimates suggest that when initial venture funds originate from a 
dedicated CVC unit, the average return to CVC acquisitions is only 0.5% lower than the 
return to non-CVC acquisitions (-2.90% + 2.43%). In contrast, the estimated gap in 
returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisitions widens to 2.9% when initial funds originate 
from product groups or other corporate departments.   
In unreported regressions (available upon request), we ran numerous diagnostic 
tests and obtained similar findings. First, we omitted deals made by either Intel 
Corporation, an unusually prolific investor with a dedicated unit, or Cisco Systems, a 
frequent acquirer with controversial CVC contract practices (Cohen 2002). Second, we 
experimented with alternative measures for acquisition experience (restricting counts to 
entrepreneurial-firm takeovers only) and CVC experience (using dollar values rather than 
                                                 
16 In earlier work, Siegel et al. (1988) report similar statistics; roughly 40% of 52 CVC investors included 
in their study organized venture financing programs in autonomous organizational units. 
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counts of portfolio companies). Third, we allowed for added sources of variation among 
acquirers by controlling separately for either the longevity of CVC programs (based on 
either the total or consecutive number of years in which the acquirer made direct CVC 
investments) or differences among acquirers in receipt of venture financing pre-IPO. 
Finally, using prior IPO exits to capture time-varying differences among firms in their 
levels of success in CVC investing, we investigated whether lower returns to CVC 
acquisitions systematically follow recent success in CVC investing given evidence that 
success fuels higher levels of overconfidence (Barber and Odean 2002; Hilary and 
Menzly 2006). The results of this analysis continued to reveal persistent performance 
differences between dedicated and non-dedicated CVC units rather than time-sensitive 
effects driven by recent success in venture financing.17 
Program Structure and Reinvestments in Portfolio Companies. If managers in 
dedicated and non-dedicated CVC units systematically differ in their degree of 
overconfidence when valuing portfolio companies, then we would expect them to make 
divergent forecasts more generally—not just when integrating portfolio companies 
through acquisition. As a final test of the overconfidence hypothesis, we therefore 
explore whether differences among firms in the internal organization of CVC programs 
similarly affect their proclivities to “throw good money after bad” when investing in 
portfolio companies. As Gompers and Lerner (2004) and Guler (2007) discuss, knowing 
when to “pull the plug” on under-performing investments is difficult even for 
independent venture capitalists. Indeed, Hardymon et al. (2007, p.8) report a common 
                                                 
17 The absence of a time-varying effect could reflect the aggregate nature of our data. Prior evidence that 
“success breeds overconfidence” is based on studies of individuals, not organizations. 
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view among professional VCs that “[VCs] don’t fail because they back bad companies 
but because they keep shoveling money into them.”  
To implement this supplemental test, we compiled investment histories from 
VentureOne of all portfolio companies for the 61 CVC investors in our sample, including 
rounds in which the focal investor did not participate. Between 1980 and 2003, these 
corporate investors financed 2,224 portfolio companies and participated in 3,534 rounds 
of financing. Roughly half (49%) of the investment rounds involved firms with dedicated 
CVC units. 
Gompers and Lerner (2000b) identify numerous factors unrelated to CVC 
program structure that can affect the probability that a startup will receive follow-on 
rounds of financing. Our baseline specification therefore controls for a variety of startup 
and investor characteristics, including startup age and stage of development and the size 
and sector of the corporate investor. Following Moeller et al. (2004) and Gompers et al. 
(2008), we also control for quarterly conditions in takeover and IPO environments. 
Finally, to address concerns that investors with dedicated CVC units simply may be 
better governed or more experienced investors, we control for each investor’s BCF 
governance index and CVC experience, defined earlier.  
We compare the reinvestment behavior of dedicated and non-dedicated CVC units 
through a series of analyses reported in Table 11. The likelihood that a corporate investor 
will reinvest in a given portfolio company (after making an initial investment) is 
computed with a Probit estimator and robust standard errors clustered by investor. 
Results from the baseline specification in Column 1 are not surprising. Startups that are 
older, in later investment rounds, and in more advanced stages of development are less 
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likely than more nascent ventures to receive follow-on rounds of financing. The 
likelihood of refinancing also is higher in more favorable environmental conditions, as 
evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on Liquidity Index. As a group, 
corporate investors in the IT sector are less likely to refinance portfolio companies than 
are investors from other sectors.  
In Columns 2-4, we divide the sample based on known outcomes of portfolio 
companies (IPOs, third-party acquisitions, failures) by the end of 2005 and compare the 
willingness of investors with different program structures to reinvest in each subsample. 
Controlling for other factors likely to affect refinancing decisions, dedicated CVC units 
are significantly more likely than non-dedicated units to reinvest in ventures with 
successful exits, by 18.4% for IPOs (in Column 2) and 10.8% for third-party acquisitions 
(in Column 3). Surprisingly, the absolute likelihood of refinancing failed ventures is 
statistically indistinguishable for dedicated and non-dedicated CVC units (Column 4). 
The relative propensity to refinance promising versus under-performing ventures 
nonetheless appears to differ between the groups. 
Columns 5 and 6 probe this difference further by splitting the sample by 
organizational structure type and estimating whether, within program type, investors 
systematically discriminate between projects of varying success. For non-dedicated units 
in Column 5, the probability of reinvestment fails to differ significantly for successful 
and unsuccessful ventures. In contrast, dedicated CVC groups in Column 6 are 11.4% 
less likely to reinvest in companies that fail, again implying superior proficiencies in the 
allocation of reinvestments toward more promising projects.18  
                                                 
18 This finding is difficult to explain through a simple selection process whereby non-dedicated units pick 
lower quality startups for initial funding. If such groups invest in lower quality portfolio companies yet are 
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Finally, Column 7 in Table 11 combines the sample and estimates whether 
reinvestment practices differ significantly between group types. To do so, we interact 
Dedicated CVC unit with Startup failed, which is set to 1 if VentureOne lists the 
company as “bankrupt” or “out of business” by the end of 2005. Controlling for other 
factors likely to affect reinvestment decisions, Column 7 shows that dedicated CVC units 
have a higher overall baseline probability of refinancing portfolio companies, a fact that 
the specification in Column 5 would fail to discern. Nonetheless, the negative and 
significant coefficient on the Dedicated CVC unit * Startup failed interaction term further 
indicates that dedicated groups are less likely to continue to fund languishing ventures in 
their investment portfolios.19  
Following Gompers (1995), our assumption in the above specifications is that 
failing ventures emit warning signals (e.g. missed milestones or product delays) that are 
observable to investors in a given round but that are unobservable to us until ex post. We 
then test whether CVC groups (dedicated/non) respond differently to those warning 
signals.20An alternative interpretation is that the decision of the corporate investor to 
discontinue investing causes the startup to fail, thus calling into question the direction of 
causality. At apparent odds with this view, Column 5 in Table 11 reports that failed and 
                                                                                                                                                 
as adept as dedicated units at “pulling the plug” on failing ventures, then the Startup failed variable also 
should be negative and significant in Column 5. 
19 Interpreting the economic significance of this statistic is difficult due to lack of data on specific levels of 
corporate funding across rounds. In total, however, non-dedicated units in our sample invested $1.776 billion in 
portfolio companies that were disbanded by 2005. Decreasing that amount by 7% would reduce these collective 
losses by $123 million ($1.776 billion * 0.07). 
20 In estimating the ability of independent VCs to refinance projects of varying success, Gompers (1995, 
Table VII) similarly uses the final outcomes of startups to predict receipt of multiple rounds of financing. 
He explains, “a plausible explanation for these results is that venture capitalists gather information about 
the potential profitability of projects over time. If venture capitalists receive favorable information about 
the firm…[they] continue to fund the project. Firms that have little potential are liquidated.” (p. 1483). 
Similar specifications have also been used in the labor economics literature to analyze the relationship 
between women’s labor participation and future divorce (Johnson & Skinner 1986; Sen 2000, 2002). In that 
literature, future divorce (used to proxy for “anticipation of divorce”) is used as an independent variable to 
predict current labor participation. 
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successful ventures are similarly likely to receive follow-on funds from non-dedicated 
units. For reverse causality to explain the empirical regularities in Table 11, the 
termination (continuation) of funding by dedicated CVC units also would need to cause 
greater harm (value) to portfolio companies than equivalent actions of corporate investors 
with non-dedicated units. Absent a natural experiment or finer-grained data, it is difficult 
to empirically distinguish between these interpretations. Reverse causality alone seems 
unlikely to explain, however, the broad consistency in our findings: Investors that house 
CVC programs in autonomous organizational units realize more favorable outcomes than 
do corporate investors with less systematized programs—both in the value captured from 
portfolio-company acquisitions (Table 10) and in the allocation of reinvestments toward 
successful (versus languishing) venture projects (Table 11).  
2.4.4. Interpretational Issues and Interview Insights 
As noted earlier, interpretation of this “dedicated unit” effect is not without 
ambiguity. Consistent with behavioral theories, managers from dedicated CVC units 
could be less prone to judgment bias when valuing portfolio companies, possibly due to 
greater exposure to investment opportunities or superior training in finance. An 
alternative explanation, which we are unable to rule out, is that housing CVC activities in 
standalone units enables superior monitoring or compensation of investment activities, 
thus helping mitigate program-level agency problems. Future research could disentangle 
these explanations more fully through access to data on the backgrounds and 
compensation packages of managers involved in CVC financing activities.  
Our conversations with corporate venturing and business development managers 
point simultaneously to overconfidence and agency-based explanations. An executive 
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from a large diversified IT firm explained that his firm’s corporate venturing activities 
were reorganized under one organizational umbrella to ensure greater accountability. In 
his view, budgets for CVC investments were being used to support discretionary 
spending within business units with little accountability for results. While not mentioned 
in the interview, the reorganization also could have improved the firm’s ability to attract 
managers with superior training or experience in private equity investing.  
At the same time, several interviewees described the challenges in managing 
relationships between technical experts from product groups or R&D departments and 
entrepreneurs from portfolio companies. On one hand, some felt that champions are 
needed to ensure sufficient “buy-in” so that employees have incentives to provide 
technical or marketing assistance to portfolio companies when requested. On the other 
hand, others observed a tendency among engineers to become “overcommitted” to 
projects of portfolio companies. Consistent with professional VCs interviewed by Guler 
(2007) and Hardymon et al. (2007), corporate investors we met with frequently cited 
“emotional attachment” to portfolio companies.  
Interestingly, CVC managers voiced particular concerns about technical experts 
“falling in love” with technology under development at portfolio companies or “pushing 
too hard” to ensure success in the projects. This latter insight resonates with evidence 
from Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) that managers with technical backgrounds are 
more prone to upward bias when assessing the future value of projects that involve them. 
More broadly, these interviews reveal both economic and behavioral influences on CVC 
investment decisions and the outcomes associated with those investments.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
Despite theoretical attention to the strategic nature of corporate venture capital 
investments (Hellmann 2002), empirical research on this topic remains limited. This 
study contributes new evidence by estimating the returns to 61 top CVC investors when 
acquiring entrepreneurial firms. Surprisingly, we find that acquisitions of portfolio 
companies tend to destroy value for shareholders of these corporate investors, even 
though these same investors otherwise are “good acquirers” of entrepreneurial firms. We 
explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which appear to stem from 
managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the CVC program level.  
A number of unresolved issues invite further study. First, future studies could 
probe more deeply into why and how program structure affects overconfidence bias 
and/or agency problems in CVC investing, ideally through use of individual-level data or 
more structured qualitative investigation. Similarly, the trade-offs firms face when 
designing CVC programs warrant more systematic investigation. If dedicated units out-
perform non-dedicated units, why do so many firms (almost 50% in our sample) relegate 
venture financing activities to product groups or other corporate departments?  
Finally, it is unclear why our findings contrast so sharply with those reported in 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), where pharmaceutical firms are shown to earn positive 
and significant returns when acquiring former alliance partners. In principle, alliances 
and corporate venture capital both enable firms to gain information about potential 
candidates for acquisition. Future research could investigate whether our contrasting 
findings are due to sector-specific factors, the involvement of venture capitalists as 
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intermediaries, or organizational factors that differentially affect the management and 
performance of corporate venturing programs.  
In a review of the acquisitions literature, Andrade et al. (2001, p. 118) conclude 
that research on how acquisitions create or destroy value is a “wide open [area of 
investigation], spanning the fields of corporate finance, industrial organization, 
organizations, and strategy.” Our findings suggest that CVC investing is a fruitful arena 
in which to further explore how organizational structure affects the value created or 
destroyed by corporate finance decisions. 
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Table 2.1 Sample Distribution by Announcement Year and Acquisition Type 
The sample includes acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms (less than 12 years old) made by 61 corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investors from 1987 through 2003. CVC (non-CVC) acquisitions are acquisitions in 
which the acquirer had (had not) provided venture funds to the target at an earlier stage of development. 
Information technology acquirers are firms with primary lines of business in software (SIC737), computer 
hardware (SIC357), semiconductors (SIC367), telecommunications (SIC481, 484), communications 
equipment (SIC366), and electronic instruments (SIC381, 382). 
 
# % all 
non-CVC
# % all 
CVC
# % total % with IT 
acquirer
1987 7 2% 1 1% 8 2% 50%
1988 6 1% 1 1% 7 1% 57%
1989 10 2% 4 4% 14 3% 86%
1990 6 1% 0 0% 6 1% 67%
1991 3 1% 2 2% 5 1% 100%
1992 8 2% 1 1% 9 2% 67%
1993 8 2% 4 4% 12 2% 100%
1994 13 3% 3 3% 16 3% 75%
1995 30 7% 3 3% 33 6% 64%
1996 31 7% 4 4% 35 7% 83%
1997 28 6% 2 2% 30 6% 80%
1998 48 11% 7 8% 55 10% 82%
1999 77 17% 11 12% 88 17% 83%
2000 67 15% 19 21% 86 16% 78%
2001 37 8% 9 10% 46 9% 67%
2002 33 7% 13 15% 46 9% 74%
2003 29 7% 5 6% 34 6% 76%
Total 441 100% 89 100% 530 100% 76%
Non-CVC Acquisitions CVC Acquisitions Pooled SampleAnnouncement 
Year 
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Table 2.2 Acquirer Abnormal Returns by Acquisition Type 
This table presents the two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to 61 corporate venture capital 
(CVC) investors from acquiring entrepreneurial firms (less than 12 years old) during 1987-2003. CVC 
(non-CVC) acquisitions are defined as acquisitions in which the acquirer had (had not) provided venture 
funds to the target at an earlier stage of development. Panel A reports results for the full sample, while 
Panel B restricts the sample to private targets only. Confounding events and acquisitions announced during 
overlapping event windows are omitted from the sample. Economic impact is calculated as the CAR 
multiplied by the market capitalization of the acquirer at t-30. Column 3 tests for significant differences in 
the mean and median abnormal returns to non-CVC (column 1) and CVC (column 2) acquisition 




CVC              
Acquisitions
Difference            
(Col 1 vs. Col 2)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:  Full Sample (n=489)
  CAR (-1,0) 0.37%** -0.97%** 1.33%***
[0.18%] [-0.75%]** [0.93%]***
  Economic Impact ($M) $106.5 -708.1
[$8.5] [-$63.0]  
  N 415 74
Panel B:  Private Targets Only (n=409)
  CAR (-1,0) 0.67%*** -1.05%** 1.72%***
[0.50%]*** [-0.78%]** [1.28%]***
  Economic Impact ($M) 257.3 -730.1
[$18.7] [-$70.2]  
  N 338 71
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%; Col 3 reports statistical significance of differences in CAR values  
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is table reports the average two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to 61 corporate venture capital (CVC) investors when acquiring 
trepreneurial firms (less than 12 years old) during 1987-2003. CVC (non-CVC) acquisitions are defined as acquisitions in which the acquirer had (had not) 
rovided venture funds to the target at an earlier stage of its development. Panel A reports results for the full sample, while Panel B restricts the sample to private 
ets only. In both panels, results are first reported over all years in the sample period. The sample is then sub-divided into acquisitions announced before, 
uring, and after the boom period of 1999 and 2000. Confounding events and acquisitions announced during overlapping event windows are omitted from the 
ple. Economic impact is calculated as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) multiplied by the market capitalization of the acquirer at t-30. Economic impact 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:  Full Sample (n=489)
   All Years (1987-2003) 415 0.37%*** 0.18%*** 44,190.1 74 -0.97% -0.75% -52,400.51
   Sub-divided by Period:
     Pre-Boom (1987-1998) 188 0.49%** 0.25%** 26,315.7 29 -1.05% -0.82% -12,008.43
     Boom (1999-2000) 135 0.08% -0.30% -13,882.4 24 -0.70% 0.04% -28,332.26
     Post-Boom (2001-2003) 92 0.52%* 0.63% 31,756.8 21 -1.15% -1.84% -12,059.82
Panel B:  Private Targets (n=409)
   All Years (1987-2003) 338 0.67%*** 0.50%*** 86,958.4 71 -1.05% -0.78% -51,834.1
   Sub-divided by Period:
     Pre-Boom (1987-1998) 151 0.64%*** 0.41%** 14,956.1 27 -1.08% -1.10% -11,412.9
     Boom (1999-2000) 114 0.67% 0.58% 32,311.4 24 -0.70% 0.04% -28,332.3
     Post-Boom (2001-2003) 73 0.71%* 0.68%* 39,691.0 20 -1.40% -1.90% -12,089.0
Columns 2 and 3 report the statistical significance of differences in CAR values for non-CVC vs CVC acquisitions at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
Non-CVC Acquisitions CVC Acquisitions
 




   
 
















Panel A:  Acquirer Ret 74 -0.97%** 39%
   A.1.  Subsample for w 50 -0.72%* 40%
   A.2.  Subsample for w 24 -1.48%* 38%
Panel B:  Acquirer Retu 50 -0.52% 42%
Panel C:  Returns to No cement 43 0.99% 53%
* significant at 10%;  ** si
urns at Acquisition Announcement
hich Prior CVC Funding is Disclosed
hich Prior CVC Funding is Not Disclosed
rns at Initial CVC Investment Announcement
n-Acquiring CVC Investors  at Acquisition Announ
gnificant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%  
 
 
anel A presents the two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to CVC acquisition announcements 
rted in Table 2 overall then for observations in which the initial CVC investment is (is not) previously 
isclosed. Panel B presents the returns to acquirers at the time of the initial CVC investment announcement 
r the subset of observations (n=50) in which venture ties are disclosed prior to acquisition. Panel C 
eports the two-day abnormal returns upon the acquisition announcement for non-acquiring corporate 
nvestors in the target.  
 
pointment (CVC Acquisitions Only) 
Table 2.5 Summary Statistics by Acquisition Type 
Sample includes entrepreneurial firms (less than 12 years old) acquired by 61 corporate venture capital 
(CVC) investors during 1987-2003. In CVC (non-CVC) acquisitions, the acquirer had (had not) provided 
venture funds to the target at an earlier stage of development. Variable definitions and data sources are 
listed in the appendix. Financial data are in millions of constant 1996 dollars. Statistical tests are t-tests for 
equality in means, Wilcoxon tests for equality of medians, and one-tail tests of proportions for percentages. 









Panel A:  Acquirer Characteristics
Ln assets 9.1 9.2 9.1
[9.2] [9.5] [9.3]
R&D intensity 40.6 46.7 41.5
[34.1] [37.3] [34.8]
Tobin's q 4.8 4.5 4.7
[2.9] [2.2] [2.7]
Free cash flow 0.14 0.14 0.14
[0.15] [0.14] [0.14]
In IT sector 77% 76% 77%
In Life Science sector 12% 11% 12%
In other sector 11% 13% 11%
Panel B:  Deal Characteristics
Liquidity index in target sector 0.07 0.04** 0.06
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
# IPOs in target sector 25.5 21.9 25.0
[16.0] [14.0] [16.0]
Deal value, if reported 379.0 243.4 357.3
[101.0] [107.7] [103.1]
Relative size 0.03 0.02 0.03
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Payment includes stock 67% 70% 67%
Payment method undisclosed 41% 37% 40%
Deal value undisclosed 32% 26% 30%
Panel C:  Target Characteristics
Target age 5.3 4.3*** 5.1
[5.0] [4.0]** [5.0]
Employees, if identified 215.4 159.8* 206.0
[76.5] [60.0]*** [75.0]
Target is publicly-traded 19% 4%*** 16%
Target owns patents 36% 34% 36%
Target in same sector as acquirer 97% 97% 97%
Employee data identified? 79% 89% 81%
*,**,*** Significant difference between non-CVC and CVC values at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2.6 Main Results & Robustness Checks 
OLS estimates of acquirer returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisition announcements. The dependent 
variable is the two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal return. Sample includes entrepreneurial firms (less than 
12 years old) acquired by 61 corporate venture capital (CVC) investors during 1987-2003. CVC Acquisition 
equals one when the acquirer provided venture funds to the target pre-acquisition; the omitted category is 
startups acquired outright (non-CVC acquisitions). Other variables are defined in the appendix. Columns 1 
and 2 report the baseline model and main results. The remaining columns report robustness checks. In 
Column 3, the sample is restricted to venture-backed private targets. In Column 4, the sample is restricted 
further to pairs of CVC and non-CVC targets matched by lines of business and acquisition dates. Columns 
5 and 6 allow for unobserved heterogeneity among acquirers for the full sample (in column 5) and for the 
subset that make both CVC and non-CVC acquisitions (in column 6). Each specification includes year 
dummies and a dummy variable when acquirer R&D is not reported. Financial data are in millions of 
constant 1996 dollars. Robust standard errors, clustered by acquirer, are in brackets.  















Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CVC acquisition -0.0173*** -0.0177*** -0.0245*** -0.0152** -0.0154**
[0.0058] [0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0058] [0.0058]
Acquirer Characteristics
Ln assets -0.0011 -0.0008 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0033 -0.0038
[0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0017] [0.0028] [0.0040] [0.0038]
R&D intensity 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0004*** -0.0004* -0.0005**
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Tobin's q 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0037*** 0.0012 0.0010
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0014]
Free cash flow as % assets -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0142 0.0237 -0.0187** -0.0369**
[0.0041] [0.0040] [0.0099] [0.0222] [0.0092] [0.0139]
In IT sector -0.0091** -0.0097** -0.0103* -0.0123 -- --
[0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0052] [0.0091] -- --
Target Characteristics
Target age -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0007
[0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0010] [0.0016] [0.0008] [0.0007]
Target owns patents -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0011
[0.0040] [0.0039] [0.0042] [0.0057] [0.0043] [0.0046]
Target is publicly-traded -0.0144*** -0.0175*** -- -- -0.0188*** -0.0166***
[0.0051] [0.0049] -- -- [0.0048] [0.0048]
Target in same sector as acquirer 0.0092 0.0095 0.0058 -0.0152 0.0170 0.0124
[0.0087] [0.0085] [0.0119] [0.0234] [0.0108] [0.0109]
Deal Characteristics
Liquidity index in target sector 0.0103 0.0045 -0.0425 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0239
[0.0224] [0.0220] [0.0364] [0.0537] [0.0239] [0.0242]
# IPOs in target sector -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Relative size -0.0813 -0.0781 0.0162 0.0782 -0.0820 -0.0819
[0.0652] [0.0677] [0.0532] [0.0620] [0.0582] [0.0652]
Payment includes stock -0.0070 -0.0064 -0.0063 -0.0139 -0.0051 -0.0052
[0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0060] [0.0118] [0.0062] [0.0058]
Deal terms undisclosed -0.0123** -0.0132** -0.0129** -0.0179 -0.0146** -0.0137**
[0.0053] [0.0052] [0.0063] [0.0119] [0.0059] [0.0053]
Constant 0.0337* 0.0353* 0.0131 0.0608 0.0784* 0.0816**
[0.0196] [0.0200] [0.0204] [0.0376] [0.0414] [0.0401]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies No No No No Yes Yes
N 489 489 270 130 489 413
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.059 0.050 0.215 0.113 0.137
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%  
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Table 2.7 Tests for Competition-Driven Overpayment ("Owner's Curse") 
OLS estimates of acquirer returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisition announcements. The dependent 
variable is the two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal return. Sample includes entrepreneurial firms (less than 
12 years old) acquired by 61 corporate venture capital (CVC) investors during 1987-2003. CVC Acquisition 
equals one when the acquirer provided venture funds to the target pre-acquisition; the omitted category is 
startups acquired outright (non-CVC acquisitions). Other variables are defined in the Appendix. Each 
specification includes year dummies and a dummy variable when acquirer R&D is not reported. Financial 
data are in millions of constant 1996 dollars. Robust standard errors, clustered by acquirer, are in brackets. 






# IPOs * CVC 
Acq
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CVC acquisition -0.0173*** -0.0167*** -0.0158** -0.0161** -0.0185**
[0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0064] [0.0063] [0.0079]
# Corporate investors -0.0014 -0.0009
[0.0015] [0.0021]
# Corporate investors * CVC acquisition -0.0013
[0.0033]
Liquidity index * CVC acquisition -0.0251
[0.0823]
Number of IPOs * CVC acquisition 0.0001
[0.0002]
Acquirer Characteristics
Ln assets -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008
[0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013]
R&D intensity 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002*
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Tobin's q 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
Free cash flow as % assets -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0008
[0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0040]
In IT sector -0.0097** -0.0092** -0.0092** -0.0096** -0.0097**
[0.0042] [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0042] [0.0042]
Target Characteristics
Target age -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0008]
Target owns patents -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0016
[0.0039] [0.0041] [0.0041] [0.0039] [0.0039]
Target is publicly-traded -0.0175*** -0.0179*** -0.0177*** -0.0175*** -0.0175***
[0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0050] [0.0049] [0.0049]
Target in same sector as acquirer 0.0095 0.0093 0.0094 0.0094 0.0097
[0.0085] [0.0085] [0.0086] [0.0085] [0.0084]
Deal Characteristics
Liquidity index in target sector 0.0045 0.0048 0.0048 0.0051 0.0050
[0.0220] [0.0220] [0.0220] [0.0222] [0.0225]
# IPOs in target sector -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Relative size -0.0781 -0.0758 -0.0763 -0.0785 -0.0785
[0.0677] [0.0664] [0.0667] [0.0676] [0.0679]
Payment includes stock -0.0064 -0.0067 -0.0066 -0.0065 -0.0064
[0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0051] [0.0051]
Deal terms undisclosed -0.0132** -0.0135** -0.0133** -0.0133** -0.0132**
[0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0052] [0.0052]
Constant 0.0353* 0.0356* 0.0353* 0.0354* 0.0355*
[0.0200] [0.0198] [0.0199] [0.0200] [0.0201]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 489 489 489 489 489
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.057 0.057
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%  
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Table 2.8 Governance Quality for CVC Investors  
Comparison of firm-level governance quality based on indices by Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (GIM) and 
Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell (BCF) compiled from IRRC Corporate Takeover Defense publications. The GIM 
index is a 24-pt scale, whereas the BCF index is a 6-pt scale. In both cases, lower scores indicate superior 
governance quality. Mean scores are compared using two-sample t-tests. Median scores (reported in 
brackets) are compared using Wilcoxon equality tests. Columns 1 and 2 compare scores for our acquiring-
firm sample with those reported for the population of 1,500 public companies tracked by the IRRC. 
Columns 3 and 4 report governance scores for acquirers in our sample at the time that CVC and non-CVC 
acquisitions were announced.  
 
Sample firms All IRRC CVC Non-CVC
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
GIM Governance Index 8.8 9.0 8.1 8.2
[9.0] [9.0] [8.0] [8.0]
BCF Governance Index 1.8*** 2.3 1.3 1.4
[2.0] [2.0] [1.0] [1.0]
*,**,*** Statistical significance of difference at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Sample firms vs. all firms 
tracked by IRRC
Sample firms only - 
Governance quality by 
acquisition type
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Table 2.9 Tests of Firm-Level Governance Explanations 
OLS estimates of acquirer returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisition announcements. The dependent 
variable is the two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal return. Sample includes entrepreneurial firms (less than 
12 years old) acquired by 61 corporate venture capital (CVC) investors during 1987-2003. CVC Acquisition 
equals one when the acquirer provided venture funds to the target pre-acquisition; the omitted category is 
startups acquired outright (non-CVC acquisitions). Other variables are defined in the Appendix. Firm-level 
governance indices by Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (GIM) and Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell (BCF) are compiled 
from IRRC Corporate Takeover Defense publications, with lower scores indicating superior governance 
quality. Each specification includes year dummies and a dummy variable when acquirer R&D is not 
reported. Financial data are in millions of constant 1996 dollars. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
acquirer, are in brackets. 
Main Results Cash Flow GIM Index BCF Index CVC Acq * 
BCF Index
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CVC acquisition -0.0173*** -0.0229** -0.0172*** -0.0173*** -0.0213***
[0.0058] [0.0098] [0.0059] [0.0058] [0.0069]
CVC acquisition * Free cash flow 0.0407
[0.0444]
GIM governance index -0.0001
[0.0006]
BCF governance index -0.0002 -0.0007
[0.0012] [0.0014]
CVC acquisition * BCF index 0.0031
[0.0039]
Acquirer Characteristics
Ln assets -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008
[0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0014]
R&D intensity 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Tobin's q 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
Free cash flow as % assets -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0007
[0.0040] [0.0038] [0.0039] [0.0040] [0.0040]
In IT sector -0.0097** -0.0095** -0.0099** -0.0098** -0.0099**
[0.0042] [0.0041] [0.0044] [0.0042] [0.0042]
Target Characteristics
Target age -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Target owns patents -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0015
[0.0039] [0.0041] [0.0039] [0.0039] [0.0040]
Target is publicly-traded -0.0175*** -0.0172*** -0.0175*** -0.0175*** -0.0175***
[0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0050] [0.0049] [0.0050]
Target in same sector as acquirer 0.0095 0.0093 0.0093 0.0094 0.0086
[0.0085] [0.0086] [0.0085] [0.0085] [0.0081]
Deal Characteristics
Liquidity index in target sector 0.0045 0.0049 0.0044 0.0045 0.0043
[0.0220] [0.0218] [0.0220] [0.0220] [0.0221]
# IPOs in target sector -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Relative size -0.0781 -0.0769 -0.0778 -0.0782 -0.0773
[0.0677] [0.0698] [0.0675] [0.0678] [0.0681]
Payment includes stock -0.0064 -0.0071 -0.0065 -0.0063 -0.0064
[0.0051] [0.0053] [0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0051]
Deal terms undisclosed -0.0132** -0.0137** -0.0131** -0.0132** -0.0132**
[0.0052] [0.0054] [0.0052] [0.0052] [0.0052]
Constant 0.0353* 0.0377* 0.0368* 0.0362 0.0370*
[0.0200] [0.0205] [0.0216] [0.0217] [0.0216]
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 489 489 489 489 489
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.061 0.057 0.057 0.056
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.10 Tests of Overconfidence-based Explanations  
OLS estimates of acquirer returns to CVC and non-CVC acquisition announcements. The dependent 
variable is the two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal return. Sample includes entrepreneurial firms (less than 
12 years old) acquired by 61 corporate venture capital (CVC) investors during 1987-2003. CVC Acquisition 
equals one when the acquirer provided venture funds to the target pre-acquisition; the omitted category is 
startups acquired outright (non-CVC acquisitions). Column 2 tests “within CEO” differences. Column 3 
interacts CVC acquisition with an indicator set to 1 if the initial investment in the target originated from a 
dedicated CVC unit; the omitted category is investments originating elsewhere in the organization (e.g., 
product groups). Other variables are defined in the Appendix. Financial data are in millions of constant 
1996 dollars. Robust standard errors, clustered by acquirer, are in brackets. In Column 2, error terms are 
clustered by CEO.   
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CVC acquisition -0.0173*** -0.0173*** -0.0225*** -0.0226*** -0.0225*** -0.0290***
[0.0058] [0.0063] [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0067]
CVC acquisition * Dedicated CVC unit 0.0220** 0.0218** 0.0206** 0.0243**





BCF governance index -0.0005
[0.0013]
CVC acquisition * BCF governance index 0.0046
[0.0038]
Acquirer Characteristics
Ln assets -0.0008 -0.0095** -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0008
[0.0013] [0.0043] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0014]
R&D intensity 0.0002* -0.0005 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002*
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Tobin's q 0.0004 0.0012 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
[0.0009] [0.0013] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
Free cash flow as % assets -0.0008 -0.0255 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0005
[0.0040] [0.0169] [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0038]
In IT sector -0.0097** -0.4419** -0.0095** -0.0100** -0.0098** -0.0093**
[0.0042] [0.1847] [0.0041] [0.0045] [0.0042] [0.0041]
Target Characteristics
Target age -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
[0.0007] [0.0010] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Target owns patents -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0018
[0.0039] [0.0053] [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0039] [0.0039]
Target is publicly-traded -0.0175*** -0.0200*** -0.0169*** -0.0171*** -0.0169*** -0.0169***
[0.0049] [0.0054] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0048]
Target in same sector as acquirer 0.0095 0.0167 0.0090 0.0093 0.0088 0.0080
[0.0085] [0.0125] [0.0087] [0.0088] [0.0086] [0.0083]
Deal Characteristics
Liquidity index in target sector 0.0045 0.0013 0.0050 0.0048 0.0060 0.0048
[0.0220] [0.0279] [0.0220] [0.0219] [0.0221] [0.0221]
# IPOs in target sector -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Relative size -0.0781 -0.0512 -0.0866 -0.0864 -0.0857 -0.0860
[0.0677] [0.0564] [0.0652] [0.0654] [0.0656] [0.0653]
Payment includes stock -0.0064 -0.0056 -0.0053 -0.0051 -0.0053 -0.0054
[0.0051] [0.0076] [0.0052] [0.0053] [0.0052] [0.0052]
Deal terms undisclosed -0.0132** -0.0135* -0.0133** -0.0132** -0.0132** -0.0133**
[0.0052] [0.0073] [0.0054] [0.0054] [0.0054] [0.0054]
Constant 0.0353* 0.5581*** 0.0368* 0.0348 0.0385* 0.0373*
[0.0200] [0.1862] [0.0201] [0.0224] [0.0206] [0.0216]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 489 489 489 489 489 489
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.135 0.064 0.062 0.063 0.063
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Main Results Control for 
CEO-Specific 
Effects
CVC Acq * 
Dedicated Unit
Col 3, with 
CVC 
experience
Col 3, with 
Acq 
Experience
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Table 2.11 Supplemental Analysis: Reinvestments in Portfolio Companies 
Probit regressions for whether a corporate investor reinvested in a portfolio company. Marginal effects are 
reported. The unit of analysis is an investor-portfolio company investment round. The sample comprises 
investments made by 61 corporate venture capital (CVC) investors in 2,224 portfolio companies during 
1980-2003. Dedicated CVC unit equals 1 if an investment is made by a dedicated CVC unit; the omitted 
category is investments originating elsewhere in the organization (e.g., in product groups). Financial data 


















Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)
Dedicated CVC unit 0.1840*** 0.1079** 0.0241 0.1477***
[0.0581] [0.0544] [0.0494] [0.0297]
Startup failed -0.0301 -0.1152*** -0.0310
[0.0259] [0.0275] [0.0286]
Ded. CVC unit * Startup failed -0.0669**
[0.0331]
BCF governance index -0.0207 -0.0139 0.0368 -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0087 -0.0078
[0.0131] [0.0191] [0.0289] [0.0226] [0.0107] [0.0284] [0.0104]
CVC experience 0.0002*** -0.0002 0.0004*** 0.0004*** -0.0015** 0.0002 0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0001]
Corporate Investor Characteristics
Ln assets -0.0100 0.0251 0.0285 -0.0133 -0.0014 0.0056 -0.0105
[0.0112] [0.0153] [0.0242] [0.0169] [0.0108] [0.0272] [0.0100]
R&D intensity -0.0005 0.0010 0.0001 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0022 0.0002
[0.0005] [0.0012] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0020] [0.0005]
Tobin's q -0.0054* 0.0024 0.0067 -0.0006 -0.0040 0.0034 -0.0048
[0.0030] [0.0052] [0.0056] [0.0078] [0.0030] [0.0163] [0.0033]
Free cash flow as % assets 0.0100 -0.0286 -0.2765* 0.0097 0.0201 -0.0239 0.0133
[0.0447] [0.0989] [0.1466] [0.0615] [0.0445] [0.0729] [0.0431]
In IT sector -0.1571*** -0.0139 -0.1174 -0.1847** -0.0796** -0.2963*** -0.1478***
[0.0474] [0.0782] [0.0759] [0.0766] [0.0372] [0.0542] [0.0414]
Startup Characteristics
Startup age -0.0137*** -0.0035 -0.0211* -0.0108 -0.0097** -0.0199*** -0.0135***
[0.0028] [0.0121] [0.0109] [0.0105] [0.0043] [0.0031] [0.0028]
Investment round number -0.0278*** -0.0555*** -0.0022 -0.0103 -0.0210*** -0.0482*** -0.0296***
[0.0074] [0.0187] [0.0127] [0.0227] [0.0077] [0.0075] [0.0067]
In product development stage -0.0989** 0.0423 -0.1629 -0.2114*** -0.0784 -0.1358*** -0.1013**
[0.0449] [0.1664] [0.1070] [0.0808] [0.0643] [0.0496] [0.0433]
In beta testing stage -0.1188** -0.1575 -0.2342*** -0.1595* -0.0836 -0.1712*** -0.1234***
[0.0462] [0.1054] [0.0440] [0.0897] [0.0658] [0.0569] [0.0442]
In shipping product stage -0.1865*** -0.1251 -0.2706* -0.3090*** -0.1885*** -0.1814*** -0.1935***
[0.0532] [0.1348] [0.1470] [0.1132] [0.0690] [0.0553] [0.0494]
In profitable stage -0.2129*** -0.1348 -0.1984** -0.2262*** -0.2111*** -0.0837 -0.2144***
[0.0434] [0.1120] [0.0935] [0.0311] [0.0315] [0.1020] [0.0405]
Startup in IT sector 0.0552* 0.0137 0.0263 0.1164* 0.0367 0.1447*** 0.0701**
[0.0293] [0.0790] [0.0684] [0.0638] [0.0354] [0.0298] [0.0276]
Environment Characteristics
Liquidity index in startup sector 2.0838*** 3.2841 3.6692* 2.5367** 2.1469** 2.5065*** 2.2367***
[0.5346] [2.3786] [1.9734] [1.1632] [0.9746] [0.4929] [0.5683]
# IPOs in startup sector 0.0003 -0.0022* -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
[0.0004] [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0012] [0.0007] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 2939 504 483 501 1581 1354 2939
Log-likelihood -1609.25 -263.32 -249.00 -244.62 -792.96 -771.36 -1587.17
Pseudo R-squared 0.103 0.160 0.156 0.188 0.108 0.126 0.115
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Subsamples by Start-up Outcomes Subsamples by Program 
Structure
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Appendix A.  Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable Definition Data Sources
Ln assets Log of book value of total assets (item6). Compustat 
R&D intensity Annual R&D spending (item46) divided by # employees (item29). Compustat 
Tobin's q Market value of assets over book value of assets:  (item6-item60-item25*item199)/item6. Compustat 
Free cash flow Net income before extraordinary items (item14) + depreciation and amortization (item18). [Due 
to high correlations with firm size, we use Free Cash Flow as a % Asset  in our regressions, 
which divides Free cash flow by book value of assets (item6).] 
Compustat 
In IT sector Dummy variable:  1 if information technology is primary sector, 0 otherwise.  Set to 1 if primary 
line of business is in software (SIC737), computer hardware (SIC357), semiconductors (SIC367), 
telecommunications (SIC481, 484), communications (SIC366) or electronic instruments (SIC381, 
382); else set to zero.
Compustat 
In life science sector Dummy variable:  1 if life science is primary sector, 0 otherwise.  Set to 1 if primary line of 
business is in biopharmaceuticals (SIC283) or medical devices (SIC384).
Compustat 
In other sector Dummy variable:  1 if primary sector in 3-digit SIC other than ones listed above, 0 otherwise.  
Includes automotive and chemical firms and conglomerates such as General Electric.
Compustat 
Liquidity index in target sector The value of all corporate control transactions exceeding $1 million in the target sector in the 
quarter of the focal acquisition announcement divided by the total book value of assets for 
Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC code.  Following Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling 
(2002) higher indices indicate more competitive takeover markets.
SDC, Compustat
# IPOs Number of initial public offerings completed in target sector in quarter of acquisition 
announcement.
Venture Economics
Deal value Total price paid by acquirer minus fees and expenses. SDC, news articles
Relative size Deal value divided by equity market capitalization of acquirer at end of prior fiscal year. Compustat 
Payment includes stock Dummy variable:  1 for deals at least partially stock-financed, 0 otherwise. SDC, news articles
Payment method undisclosed Dummy variable:  1 for deals with undisclosed methods of payment, 0 otherwise. SDC, news articles
Deal value undisclosed Dummy variable:  1 for deals with undisclosed purchase prices, 0 otherwise. SDC, news articles
Deal terms undisclosed Dummy variable:  1 for deals with undisclosed methods of payment or purchase prices, 0 
otherwise.
SDC, news articles
Target age Acquisition year minus founding year Venture One
Employees, if identified Number of employees in acquisition year, if identified, or as last reported Venture One, CorpTech, 
news articles
Target owns patents Dummy variable:  1 if target was awarded one or more U.S. patents prior to acquisition. Delphion
Target in same sector as acquireDummy variable:  1 if target competes in acquirer line of business, 0 otherwise.  For example, if 
General Electric, which has a large medical devices business unit, acquires a start-up developing 
technologies used in medical imaging, Target in same sector as acquirer  is set equal to one. 
Venture One, Compustat
Target is publicly-traded Dummy variable:  1 if target is public when acquired, 0 otherwise. SDC




Number of CVC investors Total number of corporate investors in target. Venture One, 
VenturXpert
GIM governance index Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) governance index based on 24 antitakeover provisions.  Higher 
levels correspond to more managerial power.
GIM (2003)
BCF governance index Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell (2009) governance index based on 6 antitakeover provisions.  Higher 
levels correspond to more managerial power.
BCF (2009)
Dedicated CVC unit Dummy variable:  1 if  investment was made by a dedicated internal unit responsible for 
corporate venturing (e.g., Intel Capital; Motorola Ventures), 0 otherwise.
Venture One, 
VenturXpert
Acquisition experience Number of companies purchased by acquirer in 3 years prior to focal deal SDC
CVC experience Number of direct venture capital investments made by firm in 3 years prior to focal deal Venture One
Start-up failed Dummy variable:  1 if a start-up is listed as either "Out of Business" or "Bankrupt" by the end of 
2005.
Venture One
Investment round number Ordinal rank of the venture financing round. Venture One
In [X] stage A series of dummy variables for start-up stage of development in a given financing round. Venture One
Start-up in IT sector Dummy variable:  1 if information technology is listed as primary sector of portfolio company. Venture One
Panel D:  Other Variables used in Regressions (not otherwise listed above)
Panel A:  Acquirer Characteristics
Panel B:  Deal Characteristics
Panel C:  Target Characteristics
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CHAPTER 3 
DO CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITALISTS GAIN AN INFORMATION 
ADVANTAGE IN ENTREPRENEURIAL TAKEOVER MARKETS? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms provide a vital means by which established 
firm speed time to market and enhance existing product offerings (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; Link, 1988; Puranam et al., 2006).  As Mark Bailey, vice-
president in charge of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) at the software company 
Symantec, explains: 
“De novo innovations are becoming riskier, more expensive, and more time 
consuming in markets where survival depends on speed.  Hence, high tech firms… 
are going outside to get companies with talented people and proven products that 
can meet market demands and generate technological ‘throw-offs’ for the future.” 
(Bailey, 1995, p. 31)  
 
  
Indeed, between 1987 and 2003, established firms in the information technology (IT) 
sector spent more than $140 billion purchasing technology startups—a figure 
representing more than one quarter (26%) of the dollar amount these same firms invested 
in research and development (R&D) over the same time period.   
While the motives for acquiring startups are well established (Bower, 2001; 
Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; Link, 1988; Ranft & Lord, 2002), the performance 
implications for established firms remain unclear.  On one hand, acquisitions of young 
innovative companies can be particularly difficult to value and integrate, leading some
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scholars to caution acquirers “caveat emptor”—let the buyer beware (Coff, 1999).  On 
the other hand, the resource-based view (RBV) would suggest that it is only in cases 
where there is considerable uncertainty regarding the value of inputs that the acquirer can 
hope to earn supra-normal returns (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986, 1988)   
However, the prior literature has largely focused on the first part of this duality, 
and emphasized the challenge of acquiring startups.  Consequently, an extensive 
literature has developed on how startups can more fully signal their value, for example, 
through affiliations with prominent third-parties (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004; 
Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), filing for patents (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2007), or taking their 
company public through an initial public offering (IPO) (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007; Shen 
& Reuer, 2005b).  One limitation of signaling approaches (from the acquirer’s 
perspective) is that the startup signals its value to all potential acquirers, thereby driving 
up the price that any one acquirer must ultimately pay to acquire it and reducing the 
acquirer’s opportunity for gain.   
In this paper, I take a different approach, and examine one way that acquirers 
have tried to this reduce this information asymmetry while still preserving the 
opportunity for gain – by making investments in external information.  Specifically, I 
focus on a single type of investment, minority equity investments in privately-held 
startups by established firms, or corporate venture capital (CVC).  Such investments 
could aid corporate investors in (1) becoming more aware of technological “bets” being 
placed; (2) assisting them in valuing the technology under development; and (3) in the 
case of an acquisition, by making better use of the target once they have acquired it.  In 
principle, one by-product of CVC activities is that investing firms will have an 
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information advantage relative to other acquirers in the market to acquire technology 
startups.  Moreover, if CVC investments represent “external investments in information”, 
their effect on acquisition performance should be (a) subject to diminishing returns as the 
number of startups in a firm’s venture portfolio increases; (b) highly time sensitive, with 
recent engagement conferring advantages that are greatest in magnitude; and (c) more 
pronounced the greater the technological similarity between portfolio companies and the 
startups being acquired. 
 To test these predictions, I assemble a unique database of all venture capital 
backed (VC-backed) technology startups acquired by 219 acquirers in the information 
technology (IT) sector between 1987 and 2003.  I then compare the acquisition 
performance of firms making CVC investments to those that do not.  I supplement this 
quantitative analysis with interviews with entrepreneurs, corporate investors, and 
independent VCs, which I use to inform the hypotheses developed in this chapter, as well 
as to aid in the interpretation of the econometric results.1 
I find a statistically significant and economically large effect of CVC investing.  
Relative to firms that never invest, CVC investors gain $16M more on their average 
acquisition (the median deal size is $200 million).  This estimate is net of controls for 
characteristics of the acquirer, the target, the deal, and the market environment.  It is also 
robust to sample specifications that control for the time invariant heterogeneity of 
acquirers.  I also find that these gains dissipate quickly—only investments made in the 
current or prior year affect acquisition performance—and that the benefits of investing 
are subject to diminishing returns.   
                                                 
1 As discussed in the previous chapter, I conducted 31 open-ended interviews with individuals involved 
with corporate venture capital in 2005-2006.  In 2008, I conducted nine additional interviews with directors 
or vice-presidents involved with their firm’s corporate venture capital program. 
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This study contributes to four main strands of literature.  First, this study 
contributes both conceptually and empirically to the emerging literature on acquisitions 
of entrepreneurial firms (Capron & Shen, 2007; Coff, 1999, 2003; Reuer & Ragozzino, 
2008; Shen & Reuer, 2005b).  As mentioned, this literature has largely focused on 
mechanisms for entrepreneurial firms to signal their value to others.  Consequently, the 
literature has under-emphasized means by which acquirers may reduce information 
asymmetry while still preserving the opportunity for gain.  By examining one way that 
acquirers may gain an information advantage relative to others, I hope to move this 
literature beyond a focus on the challenges of acquiring entrepreneurial firms to the 
opportunities for strategic advantage in this important factor market.   
Empirically, despite the focus on the uncertainty and inscrutability of 
entrepreneurial targets, prior studies in this tradition have generally focused on settings in 
which information asymmetry is relatively low: samples from low-technology industries 
(e.g. waste disposal, floor coverings, etc) or where targets were mature companies with 
substantial operating histories.  For example, the average target in the Shen and Reuer 
(2005) and Capron and Shen (2007) studies is 54 and 39 years old, respectively.  
Similarly, to be included in the Coff (1999) sample, the target firm needed to be publicly-
traded for at least five years prior to being acquired.  By focusing on the acquisition of 
young, technology startups, a setting where information asymmetry is rampant, my 
results provide a useful counterpoint. 
This change in emphasis to how firms can gain an information advantage relative 
to others may, in turn, help to address a common criticism of the resource-based view 
(RBV) — despite the importance that the theory places on purchasing assets for less than 
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their economic value, the RBV does not specify how firms could accomplish this 
objective (Nothnagel & Leiblein, 2008; Priem & Butler, 2001a, b).  Barney’s original 
argument was that in any reasonably efficient strategic factor market, a rent-generating 
resource should command a price that reflects its downstream profit potential.  Hence, the 
only way for the purchasing firm to make supra-normal profits, barring luck, is (1) for the 
firm to purchase the assets for a lower price (because the acquirer has more accurate 
expectations than others regarding their future value) or (2) to create more value with the 
assets once purchased. 2  As Nothnagel and Leiblein (2008) point out, research on how 
firms can accomplish these two objectives has been neglected in the RBV literature, 
perhaps due to Barney’s (1986) skepticism that firms could improve their performance 
through investments in external information.  In this paper, I contribute to the RBV by 
suggesting, and empirically testing, whether firms’ external investments may provide the 
type of valuable, private information that can explain systematic performance differences 
in takeover markets for entrepreneurial firms. 
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on corporate venture capital, 
particularly the nascent literature regarding the use of CVC investments to inform 
acquisition decisions.   In chapter 2, I compare the performance of CVC investors when 
acquiring startups they have invested in (i.e. portfolio companies) versus startups they 
acquired outright (i.e. no prior investment).  More recently, Benson and Ziedonis 
(hereafter BZ 2009) show that some CVC investors, particularly those with a stable 
pattern of investing and that devote a moderately high share of their R&D externally, 
earn higher returns on their acquisitions than others.  A limitation of both prior studies, 
                                                 
2 While Barney (1986) focused on the first explanation, Makadok (2001) explicitly captured both 
explanations by distinguishing between “resource picking” and “capability building” explanations of firm-
specific rents. 
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however, is that because the samples were limited to CVC investors, neither study was 
able to examine more generally whether CVC investing caused a boost to acquirer returns 
above that otherwise earned by non-investors.  By explicitly comparing the performance 
of CVC investors to non-CVC investors, this paper builds on and extends that research. 
Finally, this study contributes to the broader literature on strategic alliances.  
Corporate venture capital investments can be considered as one very specific type of 
strategic alliance—those characterized by an equity stake, and involving a large, 
established firm investing in a much smaller startup.  In that sense, this study is similar to 
prior work that has established that strategic alliances are a powerful source of learning 
about technologies developed at partner firms (e.g. Inkpen, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman, 1996; Simonin, 1999).  This study departs from the prior strategic alliance 
literature by examining to what extent, if at all, information gathered through one means 
(e.g., strategic alliances or CVC investing) can spill over to affect performance in another 
(e.g., acquisition performance).  In contrast, the prior alliance literature has focused more 
narrowly on two types of potential benefits from alliances: (1) firms using alliances to 
learn about new technologies from partner firms (e.g. Inkpen, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996; 
Simonin, 1999); or (2) firms learning from their prior alliance experience lessons they use 
to forge more successful alliances in the future (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer, 
& Singh, 2002; Sampson, 2005).  Hence, one contribution of this paper is to consider 




3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
3.2.1 Imperfections in the market to acquire startups 
While established firms frequently acquire startups as a source of new products 
and new technologies, nevertheless, such acquisitions pose real challenges to acquirers.  
Within the broader literature on acquisitions, studies have repeatedly shown that profiting 
from acquisitions (from the perspective of the acquirer) is both difficult and rare 
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Jarrell, Brickley, & 
Netter, 1988; Moeller et al., 2005).  Indeed, most acquisitions fail to create value for the 
acquiring firm (Bruner, 2002).3 
In addition to these well-documented challenges, the acquisition of 
entrepreneurial firms poses several additional hurdles.  First, by definition, such 
acquisitions involve firms that are young and small, and plagued by high levels of 
uncertainty.  Such uncertainty is particularly acute for companies with few tangible assets 
and whose performance is difficult to assess, such as early-stage, high technology 
companies with a heavy reliance on research and development (Coff, 1999, 2003).  
Moreover, in contrast to the market for publicly-traded firms, the market to control 
privately-held firms is less transparent.  Public firms must meet a number of regulatory 
disclosures and file detailed financial and operating information at regular intervals; 
private firms are not required to make similar disclosures.  Finally, private firms lack the 
                                                 
3 This is also a commonly-held view in the practitioner literature.  For example, one recent practitioner 
book on acquisitions noted, “The sobering reality is that only about 20 percent of all mergers really 
succeed. Most mergers typically erode shareholder wealth.”(Grubb & Lamb, 2001, p.9-10).  Surveys of top 
managers point to similarly depressed perceptions of success (Bekier, Bogardus, & Oldham, 2001; KPMG, 
1999).  Indeed, Warren Hellman, the former head of Lehman Brothers concluded, “So many mergers fail to 
deliver what they promise that there should be a presumption of failure.  The burden of proof should be on 
showing that anything really good is likely to come out of one”  (Sirower, 1997). 
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observable price (in the form of a stock price on an exchange) of their publicly-traded 
counterparts, making it more difficult for acquirers to calibrate their bids. 
 In contrast, the resource-based view has emphasized the importance of 
uncertainty in creating opportunities for gain (Barney, 1989; Yao, 1988).  Indeed, one of 
Barney’s key insights was that one way for firms to obtain needed resources at a price 
that can create competitive advantage is to purchase them in imperfect markets with more 
accurate expectations of their future value.  However, as mentioned earlier, he did not 
elaborate on how firms could develop this improved foresight (Barney, 1986).  Indeed, 
Barney held out little hope that firms could gain competitive advantage through 
investments in environmental analysis or competitive intelligence, arguing that 
information gleaned through these means would already be in the public domain.4 
Whatever its source, the RBV would indicate that in order to provide an advantage 
relative to other acquirers, the information would need to be (1) relevant (valuable) to the 
acquisition at hand, and (2) private.   
  
3.2.2 Why might CVC investments provide an information advantage? 
In principle, CVC investments conform well to these criteria.  Specifically, CVC 
investing may provide three types of related, but conceptually distinct, information that 
meet those criteria: (1) information about new technologies, both where the “state of the 
art” stands and where it is heading (2) information about the quality (and price) 
                                                 
4 Barney states, “Of these two sources of insights into the future value of strategies [e.g. analysis of (1) a 
firm’s competitive environment and (2) its internal skills and capabilities], environmental analysis seems 
less likely to systematically generate the expectational advantages needed to obtain above normal returns.  
This is because both the methodologies for collecting this information and the conceptual models for 
analyzing it are in the public domain….Thus, analyzing a firm’s competitive environment cannot, on 
average, be expected to generate the expectational advantages that can lead to above normal returns in 
strategic factor markets.” (1986, p. 1238). 
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distribution of startups in the environment, and (3) private deal information regarding 
what other firms are willing to pay for startups.  I examine each in turn below. 
 First, CVC investments may provide information about the direction of new 
technologies.  Indeed, the most common objective listed by CVC investors is to gain a 
“window on new technologies and new markets” (Alter & Buchsbaum, 2000; Siegel et 
al., 1988; Yost & Devlin, 1993).  In my conversations with managers, they pointed to 
similar objectives, with comments like, “I call them ‘eyes and ears’ investments, because 
they serve as my eyes and ears into that market.”  Another referred to his investments as 
his “technology headlights.” Through their CVC investments, established firms gain 
exposure to projects underway at startups, and they gain experience evaluating and 
valuing emerging technologies (Block & MacMillan, 1993; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006).  
Moreover, by observing the progress (and setbacks) of these technical undertakings, 
investing firms can gain an understanding of the direction of technological trajectories in 
the external entrepreneurial environment and their viabilities and potential for growth. 
Thus, external investments can lead to insights unlikely to emerge had the firm “turned 
inward” and relied solely on input from its internal R&D activities.  Taken together, such 
information could not only raise awareness of potential acquisition opportunities, but 
could also aid (1) in the pricing of startups considered for acquisition or (2) in creating 
more value with the startup once acquired. 
Second, CVC investments may provide investing firms with information about 
the landscape or distribution of startup firms in the environment.  Through evaluating and 
investing in startups as part of a CVC program, firms are exposed to a broader set of 
startups than they might otherwise consider.  Such information is particularly valuable 
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regarding privately-held startups (or young, technology startups) where information about 
their existence or quality is otherwise difficult to obtain, information gained through 
CVC investments may allow firms to “fill in the gaps” regarding the distribution of 
startups.  For example, one senior manager explained, “When we announced [our CVC 
program], startups started coming out of the woodwork—companies we had never heard 
of.”    
Moreover, as the value of any technology is affected not only by its intrinsic 
value, but also by such factors as the number and quality of firms developing competing 
technologies, CVC investments can aid in acquisition decisions by “filling in the gaps” 
regarding the condition of rival technologies.5  For example, another manager remarked:   
“My experience has been that market research gives you a perspective that is a 
mile wide but an inch deep.  This way [by making a CVC investment], we would 
fly these guys [the startup’s top management team] out every month for a half-day 
meeting to have them talk through issues with our senior management—their view 
of trends, perspective on competitors, and so on….For example, they would give 
us detailed presentations on each of their competitors.  I would say, ‘Take me 
under the hood of competitor X’s technology – how does it work? Who are their 
customers? What demographic is adopting their technology? How are they 
making money?’ It wasn’t the kind of stuff I could get by commissioning a market 
research firm to do a survey.” 
 
Equally important, several managers also pointed to the value of learning what 
wasn’t working, particularly that substitute technologies were worth less than they had 
previously thought.  One manager said, “We were interested in [a wireless technology].  
What we found in our investing was that none of the firms in that space were ready for 
                                                 
5 Similarly, consider Ebay’s 2005 acquisition of Skype.  At the time of the acquisition, many analysts 
expressed concern over the high price, given that many alternate technologies (and alternate VOIP 
providers) offered similar functionality, including Google Talk, Yahoo Messenger, AOL Instant 
Messenger, Vonage, and startups Teleo and Jajah. As one analyst noted, “All of these companies are 
coming from [only] slightly different directions and could all play a part in the future of [online 
communications].”  Subsequent events seemed to bear this out, as Ebay wrote off $1.4 billion of Skype’s 
$2.6 billion purchase price in late 2007 (Kharif, 2007).   
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prime time because they didn’t scale well.” Similarly, another manager noted, “I looked 
at five startups in [a new battery technology], but I passed on all of them because none of 
them were up to snuff….It made great copy for a press release or news article, but when 
you looked under the hood, there was nothing there.”  In addition, other managers noted 
the importance of understanding market conditions in these new areas more generally.  
One commented, “We learned that a lot of things that we thought would be big trends 
turned out not to be….I can’t count all of the trends that we thought would persist that 
didn’t.”  Such knowledge can be particularly useful in shaping acquisition decisions, 
because CVC investors can better compare a particular acquisition target against the 
distribution (both in terms of quality as well as price) of other startups and technologies 
in the marketplace.    
Finally, through engaging in CVC activities, firms may gain access to private deal 
information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain.  Corporate investors generally 
acquire only a small percentage of the companies in their portfolios (Maula & Murray, 
2000).  More commonly, such startups “exit” through acquisitions by third-parties or by 
offering shares to the public in an IPO (Gompers & Lerner, 2000b).  By virtue of their 
equity stake, CVC investors are privy to information about sales of startups not available 
to outsiders, such as deal terms, purchase price, and rival bids not disclosed to the 
public.6  Moreover, because private information gathered through exit-event negotiation 
is acquired in “real-time,” to the extent the deal price is subsequently disclosed (in 
databases such as VentureOne or VentureXpert), investing firms gain access to the 
                                                 
6 For example, in my sample nearly one quarter (24%) of startups do not disclose either their purchase price 
or the terms of the deal. 
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information sooner.  In the meantime, the CVC investor can draw upon this information 
to inform its own negotiations when acquiring startups.   
 In summary, I suggest that investments in external information can improve 
acquisition performance.  Specifically, CVC activities provide three types of information 
that may be relevant to acquisition performance, and that are not readily available to non-
investors: (1) information about new technologies (2) information about the “landscape” 
of startups, and (3) private deal information about what other firms are willing to pay.  
Together, this logic leads to the following empirical prediction:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  Ceteris paribus, CVC investing will improve the performance of 
established firms when acquiring startups.   
 
If CVC investing confers information advantages to potential acquirers (relative 
to others), then several related predictions follow:  First, the benefits should be subject to 
diminishing returns; second, they will be highly time sensitive; and third, the benefit will 
be more pronounced the greater the similarity between investment firms and acquisition 
firms.  I elaborate on each of these ideas below.  
Startups are more likely to work on R&D projects that are more novel and riskier 
than those of established firms (Aghion & Tirole, 1994).  Hence, by working with 
startups, established firms may be exposed to technologies that differ from the ones they 
are working on internally.  When a firm’s CVC portfolio is small, each additional 
investment may provide a large amount of “new” information that the firm did not 
hitherto have.  As the firm’s portfolio increases in size, I expect that each additional 
portfolio company will provide some information that is new and some that is redundant 
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(e.g., information that the CVC investor already possessed).  Hence, each additional 
investment provides less and less new information.  Therefore, I predict diminishing 
marginal returns (to acquisition performance) to increases in CVC portfolio size.7  Stated 
more formally: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.  Ceteris paribus, as the size of an established firm’s venture 
portfolio increases, the added gains to acquisition performance will increase at a 
decreasing rate.   
 
Third, while CVC investments may confer informational advantages to acquiring 
firms, such benefits are likely to be short-lived.  There are two primary reasons to expect 
that the value of the information will erode quickly.  First, information gleaned from 
CVC investing is valuable (with respect to acquisitions) only to the extent that is not 
available to other acquirers (Barney, 1986, 1988).  As time passes, technical information 
may leak out as consulting reports get published, employees switch jobs, or information 
otherwise becomes public (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Hall, 2005; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 
2001).  Hence, the private information received through CVC investing becomes less 
valuable because other potential acquirers become aware of it.  Second, the information 
loses its value as markets conditions change.  First, technologies change; what is state-of-
the-art in one time period can become obsolete in the next.  Therefore, information about 
technologies can rapidly become outdated.  Moreover, the value of other types of 
                                                 
7 The organizational learning literature, particularly the literature involving learning curves makes a similar 
prediction, but for slightly different reasons (Argote, 1999; Argote & Epple, 1990).  In the organizational 
learning literature, firms are predicted to learn from experience.  These lessons learned are, in turn, 
expected to improve firm performance in some fashion (often measured as reductions in direct labor costs, 
time to completion, mistakes per batch, etc).  Generally experience is measured as the firm’s cumulative 
production.  However, in that literature the mechanism of action is the lessons learned from prior 
experience.  In this study, the mechanism of action is new information gathered in the process of making 
investments.   
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information that CVC investments provide—about the distribution of startups and what 
other acquirers are willing to pay—also erodes quickly. New startups may enter or exit, 
existing startups may shift their focus, and deal terms can leak out or become irrelevant.  
Hence, I expect that a firm’s recent CVC activities are far more informative when 
deciding which startups to acquire and how much to pay than investments made long ago.  
Consequently, I predict that:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.   The beneficial effects of CVC investing on the acquisition 
performance of established firms will dissipate quickly.  
 
Finally, prior research suggests that not all investments will be of equal value in 
providing new information to the corporate investor.  In particular, the information 
gathered must be relevant to the acquisition at hand if it is to improve acquisition 
performance (Ahuja & Katila, 2001).  Prior studies regarding both acquisitions and 
alliances have found that similarity within a business development activity (e.g. alliances 
or acquisitions) enhances performance.  For example, both Anand and Khanna (2000) 
and Sampson (2005) find that value creation was increasing in the amount of technical 
overlap between prior alliances and the focal alliance.  Similarly, both Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999) and Hayward (2002) find that acquirers are able to draw more 
valuable inferences the greater the similarity between current and prior acquisitions.  In 
this paper, I extend this general logic to argue for benefits across business development 
activities.  That is, the potential for information spillovers is likely to be greatest when 
the startup being acquired is similar to the startups in which the acquirer has been 
investing.  As relatedness increases, the information regarding technology gleaned from 
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the portfolio companies is more likely to be relevant.   Moreover, the information about 
potential substitutes and what other startups are “out there” is more likely to be finely 
tuned to the acquisition at hand.  And finally, the information regarding deal terms and 
valuation will be more pertinent.  Hence: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4.  Ceteris paribus, the beneficial effects of CVC investing on the 
acquisition performance of established firms will be more pronounced the greater the 
similarity between the startups being invested in and the startups being acquired. 
 
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
The central objective in this study is straightforward – to establish a causal link 
between the CVC-related activities of established firms and their performance when 
acquiring startups.  Without a natural experiment that sorts otherwise identical firms 
randomly into CVC investors and non-investors, however, establishing a causal link 
poses an empirical challenge.  Indeed, a natural concern is that CVC investing, rather 
than having a causal effect, is merely proxying for a “good firm” effect.  In response, I 
use two complementary approaches to triangulate my results.  First, I estimate differences 
in performance “between” CVC investors and non-investors while allowing for non-
random selection into CVC investing.  Second, I estimate “within firm” differences 
among the sub-set of CVC investors in periods associated with varying degrees of CVC-
related activity using a firm fixed-effect specification.  If CVC investing is merely 
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proxying for good firm effect, the effect should be wiped out in this second set of 
analyses.8     
 
3.3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
These hypotheses are tested using acquisitions of startups in the information 
technology (IT) industry between 1987 and 2003.  Several characteristics of the IT 
industry make it an appropriate setting for this study.  First, firms in the information 
technology industry have been among the most active in using corporate venture capital 
to invest in technology startups, a fact that is not surprising given the rapid pace of 
technological change in the industry (Dushnitsky & Lenox 2005a).  Second, established 
IT firms frequently use the acquisition of young, entrepreneurial startups as a way to 
develop new products and access new technologies (Ranft & Lord 2002; Chaudhuri et al. 
1999; Goldblatt 1999).  Finally, acquisitions are an important mode of exit for startups in 
the IT sector, representing the most common exit event for VC-backed IT startups over 
the last two decades (VentureOne, 2005).  Moreover, restricting the sample to a single 
sector (albeit broadly defined) also allows me to hold several industry-level factors 
constant, such as technological opportunities and the strength of intellectual property 
(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a).   
To construct the sample, I first identified all publicly-traded IT firms that acquired 
at least one VC-backed startup firm between 1987 and 2003.  The “information 
                                                 
8 However, the fixed effect model, while useful in looking for causal effects, is not as well-suited to 
answering the related question, “what would be the expected gain, if any, for the marginal (generally much 
smaller and resource-contrained) firm adopting CVC investments?”.  Consider the case where only large 
firms adopt CVC programs and small firms do not.  The counterfactual outcome—what performance 
enhancement, if any, a small firm would gain if it started CVC investment—is not parametrically 
identified.  Instead, the linear functional form identifies this counterfactual outcome. 
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technology” sector is defined in accordance with standard NSF categories and includes 
all firms with primary lines of business in computer hardware, software, semiconductor, 
telecommunications, and electronics equipment.  To ensure that acquirers are 
“established firms,” the sample was limited to publicly-traded firms that report R&D 
spending for five or more years.  This restriction omitted numerous short-lived internet 
firms that launched IPOs in the late 1990s but exited soon thereafter.  I then utilized the 
SDC and VentureOne databases to identify all acquisitions of VC-backed startups made 
by these firms between 1987 and 2003.  Since VentureOne tracks firms only until they 
have an initial exit event (such as an IPO), SDC was utilized to include venture-backed 
firms that had an IPO but were later acquired.  By imposing the “VC-backed” restriction 
on the acquisitions, I ensure a minimum threshold in the (unobserved) quality of startups 
acquired and am able to capture key control variables (e.g. year founded, target age, and 
prior equity ties between the acquirer and startup) that are otherwise difficult to observe.   
Firms were considered startups if they were less than 12 years old (acquisition 
year minus founding year) when acquired.  While the entrepreneurship literature has been 
divided over whether it is better to define entrepreneurial firms using a size (e.g. 500 or 
1000 employees) or an age (e.g. less than 10 or 12 years old) threshold, the age threshold 
seemed more appropriate given my interest in young, innovative companies.9  Moreover, 
using a size threshold would have thrown out the fastest growing (and hence, some of the 
most successful) firms in the sample.  The 12-years-old cutoff seems appropriate because 
                                                 
9 For example, Puranam et al. (2005) define “technology start-ups” as firms with fewer than 1,000 
employees when acquired while Acs and Audretsch (1988) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) use a 500-
employee threshold.  Hellman and Puri (2000, 2002) define “start-ups” as firms less than 11 years old and 
do not impose an upper bound on firm size.  In the Stuart et al. (1999) study, the maximum age of venture-
backed biotechnology firms at IPO is 12 years since founding.  
 
 87
most venture capital funds have a 10-year lifespan, and they generally must liquidate 
their stakes in their portfolio companies at that point (Gompers & Lerner, 1996).  Hence, 
most VC-backed startups must exit through either an acquisition or IPO by that time.  For 
example, per VentureXpert, between 1987 and 2003, the average portfolio firm was 8.1 
years old at IPO.  Also, as will be seen in the results section, my results are unchanged 
when the age cutoff is changed to 10 or 8 years. 
Finally, supplemental information about target firms and their acquisition was 
gathered from SDC Platinum, VentureSource, VentureXpert, Delphion, as well as from 
searches of news articles and press releases.  Based on these selection criteria, 545 
acquisitions made by 219 acquirers between 1987 and 2003 were identified. 
 
3.3.2 Dependent Variable 
 I estimate acquisition performance using the stock market’s reaction to an 
acquisition announcement, a methodology that is widely used to evaluate value creation 
by scholars in both management and finance (Andrade et al., 2001; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004).  While such a 
measure captures the market’s expectations of anticipated gains (or losses) ex ante, a 
sizeable body of evidence has confirmed that it is a good predictor of ex post 
performance, such as return on assets, cash flow, and innovative performance (Healy, 
Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006). 
The unexpected, or “abnormal,” return generated from a particular acquisition is 
calculated as the difference between the acquirer’s actual return and the return that would 
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have been expected had the acquisition not taken place.  Following standard practice, I 
calculate the unexpected return for firm I at time t as follows: 
Unexpected returnit = Actual Returnit – Expected Returnit 
The actual return is merely the observed change in the firm’s daily stock price.  The 
expected return is calculated using the market model: 
Expected returnit = αi + βiRmt 
Where Rmt is the return on the broader market on day t, and αi + βi are firm-level 
measures that are estimated over a period (250 days) prior to the event.  Following Brown 
and Warner (1990), p-values are corrected for serial correlation in the event window. 
 Acquisition dates were compiled from the SDC and VentureOne databases.   
Since VentureOne generally reports the date an acquisition was completed, rather than 
the date it was announced (the relevant date for an event-study), I searched SDC 
Platinum and Factiva for the first date that an acquisition was announced.  In addition, a 
market-based event-study provides an unbiased measure of an acquisition only if other 
major corporate events are not announced during the event window (MacKinlay, 1997).  
Consequently, I searched news accounts to determine whether the acquirer announced 
another acquisition or other significant corporate events during the event window.    Of 
the 545 acquisitions originally identified, 19 were eliminated due to confounding events 
(such as the announcement of another acquisition or the settlement of a lawsuit).  After 




3.3.3 Explanatory Variables 
I am interested in assessing the potential benefits (or lack thereof) of CVC-
investing activities on the acquisition performance of established firms.  There are many 
possible ways of estimating these effects.   As a result, I discuss my primary ways of 
operationalizing key variables below, but later introduce alternative measures to test the 
robustness of my results.  I use four primary measures of a firm’s CVC investing, 
capturing several different aspects regarding both the existence and the level of CVC-
investing made by established IT firms.   My first two measures of CVC activity are 
simple 0/1 indicator variables (Acquirer is a prominent CVC investor and Acquirer is an 
Active CVC investor in current year) for whether the acquirer was ever among the 100 
most active CVC investors and whether the acquirer made CVC investments in the year 
of the focal acquisition, respectively10.  While these measures are coarser than the 
continuous variables used later (CVC spending and Count of CVC investments), they 
serve as useful baseline estimates and are significantly correlated with the more refined 
measures (r = 0.51 between active CVC investor and CVC spending).  Use of the 0/1 
dummy variable has the added advantage of enabling me to estimate a two-stage model in 
which the first stage takes into account factors that affect the firm’s decision to invest in 
CVC in a given year.  I then move from the coarse indicator variables to more refined 
measures of firms’ level of CVC investment.  The variable CVC spending captures the 
dollar amount of CVC investing an acquiring firm made in millions of constant 1996 
                                                 
10 The top 100 firms represent nearly 90% (89.3%) of the investments made by corporate investors in IT 
industries.  While Intel (the most active investor) made 220 investments in 2000 alone, corporate investors 
below the top 100 made a total of three investments, on average, over the entire period of 1987 to 2003. 
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dollars, while Count of CVC investments is a count of the number of investments made by 
the acquiring firm.   
Relatedness of CVC investments to Focal Acquisition.  I conceive of relatedness 
as the similarity of the technologies used by the two sets of firms (those invested in 
versus those acquired).  Given that concern for technological similarity, a natural measure 
would be the degree of overlap in patent classes between the startups invested in and the 
startups acquired.  Unfortunately, this measure proved infeasible, as nearly two-thirds 
(62%) of the acquired startups had no patents prior to being acquired.  As an alternative, I 
measure relatedness using VentureOne’s industry group (Information Technology, Life 
Science, and Other) categories.  While each industry group is further subdivided into 
industries (e.g., semiconductors, software, and communications) a closer inspection 
suggested a great deal of overlap in the industry categories.  For example, startups 
classified as “Network devices” were sometimes device manufacturers, sometimes 
produced software for devices, and other times produced chips for network devices.  
Rather than code each startup by hand, a time-consuming (and inherently subjective) 
exercise, I count investments as being related if they are in IT startups, and unrelated if 
they are not in IT.  As an alternative measure, I use the count of startups (rather than the 
dollar amount). 
3.3.4 Control Variables 
Differences in acquirer returns can be attributable to numerous factors unrelated 
to a firm’s CVC investing activities.  Indeed, prior studies in both strategy and finance 
identify a host of variables that can affect the stock market’s reaction to an acquisition 
announcement (see McWilliams and Siegel 1997 and Andrade et al 2003 for two recent 
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reviews).  I control for these variables below to rule out the most important alternate 
explanations and to estimate the effects of interest more precisely.  For ease of 
discussion, control variables are divided into characteristics of (1) the acquirer, (2) the 
target, and (3) the deal and market environment.11  They are described in turn below. 
 
Acquirer attributes 
 Startup acquisition experience.  Prior studies suggest that firms’ acquisition 
performance can improve with experience (Haleblian & Finkelstein 1999; Hayward 
2002).  If firms that make CVC investments are also more experienced at acquiring 
startups, then any difference in performance could be the result of increased experience in 
conducting acquisitions rather than differential informational advantage due to CVC-
related activities.  I therefore control for the firm’s prior acquisition experience (Startup 
acquisition experience), calculated as the number of startups acquired in the prior three 
years (as reported in SDC), in each of my regressions.  Moreover, as some prior research 
into the effects of acquisition experience suggests a U-shaped relationship (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein 1999; Hayward 2002), I also include a squared term, Startup acquisition 
experience2.   
 Acquirer size.  It is important to control for firm size for two reasons.  First, larger 
firms may have more resources to devote to both investing in startups and acquiring 
startups.  Second, despite these additional resources, recent studies suggest that 
                                                 
11 It is important to note that many of the deal variables (e.g., Acquirer paid with stock, Deal terms not 
disclosed) are not exogenous because they represent choices made by the acquirer.  Indeed, most of them 
stem from the decision by the acquirer to make an acquisition.  For example, given that a firm decides to 
make an acquisition, it then must decide to pay with cash or stock, disclose the deal terms, etc.  However, 
because prior empirical work has documented that the market reacts to these decisions, I have included 
them in my regressions, and endogenized the decision to make CVC investments.  One can imagine, 
however, important follow-up work that endogenizes the decision to acquire. 
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acquisition returns are lower for larger acquirers relative to smaller acquirers (Moeller et 
al., 2004).  I control for firm size, calculated as the firm’s assets in the year of the 
acquisition (using data from COMPUSTAT), and which is logged due to the positive 
skewness in the measure.   
R&D intensity.  Firms with greater R&D investment may be better positioned to 
generate future profits from technology startups (Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006), 
consequently, I control separately for R&D spending.  Since R&D expenditures are 
highly correlated with firm size (ρ =.83 in my sample), they are scaled by the number of 
employees to create an R&D intensity measure.   
Cash flow / assets.  In light of Jensen’s (1986) “free cash flow” hypothesis (that 
managers at firms with large amounts of free cash flow are more likely to make value-
destroying acquisitions), I control for the cash flow available to managers, defined as 
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation.  Like R&D spending, free cash 
flow is highly correlated with firm size.  I therefore scale Free Cash Flow by the 
acquiring firm’s assets. 
  
Target attributes 
Acquirer has prior VC investment in target.  Prior research has found that returns 
are systematically lower when acquirers purchase startups in which they have previously 
invested, perhaps because as prior investors, they “over-commit” to their portfolio firms, 
leading to an “escalation of commitment” (as described in chapter 2).  Consequently, I 
include an indicator variable (Acquirer has prior VC investment in target) set to 1 if the 
acquirer has previously invested in the target, 0 otherwise.   
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Target age.  Prior empirical work has established that the age of a target can 
affect acquisition performance – either because younger firms have difficulty in signaling 
their value, or because acquisitions become more disruptive to targets as they become 
more established and more routinized in their processes (Puranam et al., 2006; 
Ransbotham & Mitra, 2006).  Target age is calculated as the acquisition year minus the 
year that the startup was founded.  Founding years were gathered from VentureOne, and 
where missing, were supplemented with data from news accounts and press releases. 
Target is publicly-traded.  Recent empirical work in finance suggests that firms 
that are publicly-traded are acquired at a premium (20–25% on average) to 
observationally equivalent privately-held firms because of the increased liquidity 
provided by public equity markets (Cooney, Moeller, & Stegemoller, 2007; Faccio, 
McConnell, & Stolin, 2006).  Target is publicly-traded is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the target is publicly-traded and 0 if it is privately-held.   
Target relative size.  Finally, integrating and utilizing acquired technologies may 
be less complicated when targets are small relative to their acquirer (Ahuja & Katila, 
2001).  Therefore, my models control for the relative size of the target to the acquirer, 
measured as the purchase price (from SDC or VentureOne) divided by the market 
capitalization of the acquirer (from COMPUSTAT). 
  
Deal and environment attributes 
Payment includes stock.  Prior empirical work has confirmed that how an 
acquisition is financed (e.g. with cash or stock), can affect the performance of the deal 
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(Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Travlos, 1987).  Payment includes stock is a binary 
variable set to 1 if any of the financing involves payment of stock, and 0 otherwise.   
Deal terms undisclosed. In addition, because acquirers are not required to disclose 
deal information when target firms are small, nearly one-quarter (24%) of my 
transactions are missing either information regarding the deal value or the method of 
payment.  To avoid omitting such observations, an indicator variable, Deal terms 
undisclosed, set to 1 if either the value of the transaction or the method of payment is 
undisclosed, is included in the regressions.12   
Boom period (1999–2000) and Post-boom (2001–2003).  To address concerns that 
the market may have reacted differently to acquisition announcements during the “boom” 
years of 1999–2000 (Moeller et al., 2005; Park & Mezias, 2005), I include two time-
period dummies in my regressions: one for whether the acquisition was made in the boom 
years of 1999–2000, and another for whether the acquisition was made in the “post-
boom” period of 2001–2003.  The omitted category is the “pre-boom” period of 1987–
1998.  As a robustness check, I included year dummies, or measures of market 
conditions, such as the dollar amount of M&A activity in the industry (as described in 
Schlingemann, Stulz, & Walkling, 2002) and the dollar amount of IPOs in the target 
sector.  Each of these measures generated similar results. 
 
                                                 
12 Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2007) provide an interesting critique of SEC rules that do not require 
acquirers to disclose details of acquisitions of privately-held targets that are less than 20% of the size of the 
acquirer because the SEC deems them “immaterial.”  Rodrigues and Stegemoller demonstrate, however 




Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations among all variables used in 
my study.  Not surprisingly, the startups are quite young and small relative to their 
acquirers.  The average startup in the sample is just over 5 years old (mean = 5.09 years) 
and roughly 7% of the size of its acquirer (mean = 7.2%).  Most of the startups were 
privately-held (86%) at the time of acquisition.  The average acquirer in the sample had 
purchased six VC-backed startups prior to the focal acquisition (mean = 5.9).  Just under 
a third of the acquisitions (30.2%) occurred during the technology boom of 1999–2000, 
with the remainder divided between the pre-boom (38.4%) and post-boom periods 
(31.4%). 
 Table 2 compares the means of several variables between CVC investors and non-
investors.  Consistent with the findings reported in Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a), I find 
that CVC investors, on average, are much larger (in both sales and assets), older, and 
have much higher cash-flow, than non-investors. 
Table 3 reports the multivariate results using the pooled sample of 219 CVC 
investors and non-investors.   Robust (White) standard errors are clustered by firm to 
account for correlation among returns to acquisitions made by the same firm.  Column 1 
reports the baseline model using control variables common in the strategy and finance 
literatures.  The first test (shown in column 2) estimates the average difference in 
acquisition performance in the IT sector between CVC investors (n=36) and non-
investors (n=183).  Column 2 shows, perhaps surprisingly, that on average, CVC 
investors in the sector do not “out-perform” non-investors when estimated over entire 
time-frame of the study (1987–2003), despite the fact that they are larger and more cash-
rich, on average, than non-investors.   
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Column 3, however, shows a striking (and statistically significant) difference in 
performance between CVC investors and non-investors in years when CVC investors are 
actively engaged in venture financing activities.  The coefficient on “Acquirer is Active 
CVC Investor in t0?” suggests that (holding constant the acquisition experience of these 
firms and other observable characteristics of the acquirers, startups, and environmental 
conditions), established firms actively engaged in CVC investing generate an additional 
1.6% in value to shareholders than would otherwise be expected.  For an acquirer with a 
$1 billion market capitalization, this differential enhancement in performance would 
generate $16 million in added gains to shareholders for the average deal.     
Column 4 in Table 2 allows firms to “self select” into CVC investing in a given 
year.  As has been increasingly recognized in the management literature, if endogeneity 
in firms’ choices is not dealt with, the resulting coefficient estimates of variables of 
interest may be biased (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998).  Indeed, a natural 
concern in this study is that “better” firms may be both more prone to invest in startups 
and to do better when making acquisitions.  Hence, OLS regressions that do not allow for 
this possibility may overstate the impact of CVC investing. To correct for this potential 
bias, I use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation procedure.13  In the first stage (shown 
in Appendix A.1), firms’ decision to make CVC investments in a given year is modeled 
using a probit model.  In the first stage I draw on prior research that examines why firms 
                                                 
13 Though this procedure is often called the Heckman selection model or simply a Heckman, it is more 
accurately described as the bivariate normal selection model utilizing the Heckman estimator (since models 
can have more than one estimator).  The estimator is an algorithm for estimating the parameter of interest, 
in this case, the omitted variable (such as motivation) that is causing the bias.  In this case, there are two 
estimators that can be used in the selection model—the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) and 
the Heckman two-step—to estimate the size of the omitted variable.  Each estimator, of course, carries its 
own set of assumptions.  In this analysis I use the Heckman two-step estimator rather than the FIML 
estimator because, despite being less efficient, it is more robust to misspecifications in functional form.  I 
thank Jeffrey Smith for pointing this out. 
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make CVC investments in the first place (Basu, Phelps, & Kotha, 2009; Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2005a).  In particular, these prior studies highlight that larger, R&D-intensive 
firms with slack resources are more likely than others to adopt CVC programs.  These 
results are confirmed in table A.1, with the variables firm size and firm free cash flow 
each being significant at the 1% level.  Interestingly, R&D intensity is not significant 
once firm size is controlled for.  This contrast with prior work may be because prior 
studies used industry R&D intensity (rather than firm) and included firms from a broad 
swath of industries.  Within the confines of a single, R&D-intensive sector (IT), firm-
level R&D intensity was not a significant predictor. 
In the second stage of the Heckman procedure, a model of acquirer abnormal 
returns is estimated, including the Lambda endogeneity bias control variable (the inverse 
of the Mills ratio [λ]) estimated from the selection model.  The variable Lambda in the 
second stage therefore serves as a proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity between firms 
that choose to make CVC investments and those that do not. 
To meet the exclusion restrictions that are important for the Heckman 
procedure14, I include one variable in the probit (selection) model that is not included in 
the second-stage regression, namely, venture capital inflows (VC_inflows).  To give the 
variable a firm-specific component, VC_inflows is interacted with the firm’s free cash 
flow in the focal year.  To serve as an exclusion restriction, the variable needs to be 
correlated with the propensity of firms to make CVC investments, but be otherwise 
unrelated to the acquisition performance of acquirers. VC inflows seem to meet these two 
                                                 
14 While technically the first-stage regression can be estimated without an exclusion restriction (e.g. a 
variable included in the first-stage that is not included in the second-stage), by so doing the model is 
identified only through the non-linearity of the probit model.  Moreover, subsequent econometric research 
has documented that, absent an exclusion restriction, the results obtained through the Heckman procedure 
are generally poor (Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007; Puhani, 2000; Stolzenberg & Relles, 1990). 
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conditions.  Prior empirical work has documented that corporate investors often “chase” 
the returns of independent VCs, such that CVC investments tend to be highly correlated 
with the capital inflows to independent venture capitalists (Gompers & Lerner, 2000a; 
Gompers, 2002; Gompers, Lerner, Blair, & Hellmann, 1998).  Indeed, in the model 
shown in appendix 1, VC inflows is a significant predictor of whether firms choose to 
make CVC investments (p<.01).  Moreover, VC inflows are unlikely to affect the 
acquisition returns to startups acquired by established firms.  Conceptually, this is 
because corporate venture capitalists often make investments for both financial and 
strategic reasons (Alter & Buchsbaum, 2000; Siegel et al., 1988; Yost & Devlin, 1993).  
Empirically, Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that startups funded during high VC 
inflow periods are not significantly different in their propensity to be acquired or IPO 
than firms funded during low periods.  The results in Column 2 suggest that CVC 
investors are not necessarily “better acquirers” as a group, and Column 4 provides little 
evidence that the results are explained by latent (unobservable) quality differences 
between CVC investors and non-investors.  If “better” firms simultaneously select into 
CVC investing and earn greater returns when acquiring startups, we should see a positive 
and significant coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio reported at the bottom of Column 4.  
Instead, the Mills ratio coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Moreover, 
the coefficient on the indicator variable, “Acquirer is Active CVC Investor in the current 
year?”, also increases in magnitude and remains significant at the 5% level.  Columns 5 
and 6 replace the blunt dichotomous variable with alternative continuous measures of 
investment activity, including the dollar amount invested in CVC (in Column 5) and the 
count of startups in which the acquirer invested (Column 6).  Both continuous measures 
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are summed across the acquisition year and the two prior years.  Since they are logged, 
they can be interpreted as percentages.  Hence, the results from column 5 suggest that a 
1% increase in CVC spending increases acquisition returns by 0.4%.  In economic turns, 
this suggests a gain of approximately $40 million on a $200 million acquisition. 
A second concern about the results reported in Table 3 is that they provide an 
“apples to oranges” comparison:  both Table 2 and the selection models suggest that 
established firms that invest in CVC are disproportionately larger and more cash-rich 
than firms that do not.  In Table 4, therefore, I conduct supplemental tests for “within 
firm” differences using the subset of acquirers that actively engage in CVC-related 
investments during the time frame of my study.  These tests investigate whether the 
startup acquisition performance of CVC investors is greater in periods in which they are 
actively engaged in venture financing activities relative to periods in which they acquire 
but invest less intensively in CVC (if at all).  
Column 1 in Table 4 estimates the same specification shown in Column 6 of 
Table 3 for the subset of CVC investors while allowing for time-invariant sources of 
heterogeneity between acquirers.  The results show that the findings reported in Table 3 
are not driven by artificial comparisons:  Even within the sub-sample of CVC investors, 
established firms earn greater acquisition returns when acquiring startups in years when 
they have larger numbers of startups in their venture portfolios.   
In line with hypothesis 3, Columns 2-4 in Table 4 also reveal strong “recency 
effects” in the informational benefits that CVC activities confer upon startup acquisition 
performance.  While investments of CVC investors have a significant, positive effect on 
acquisition performance in the immediate timeframe of an acquisition decision, the effect 
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erodes quickly.  For example, in this sample of IT acquisitions, CVC activities in the year 
of or the year prior to the focal acquisition are correlated with improved acquisition 
performance, while investments made two or more years earlier had no statistically 
discernible effect.  In unreported regressions, I tested the effect going back as far as five 
years – none of the regression results using firms’ CVC activities from these earlier years 
are statistically significant.   
I test hypothesis 3 (regarding diminishing returns) in Column 5.  As in columns 1-
4, this test includes only the subset of investors who made CVC investments between 
1987 and 2003. To test hypothesis 3, I split investor-years into quartiles based on the 
number of investments made in that year (years in which the firm made no investments is 
the omitted category).  Quartile 1 is for firms that made 1-8 investments, quartile 2 is 9-
25 investments, quartile 3 is 26-74 investments, and quartile 4 is companies that made 
more than 75 investments in a single year (Intel is the most active investor, making 220 
investments in 2000).  When I enter these quartile indicator variables, I expect the 
coefficients to be positive and significant, indicating that acquirer returns are higher as 
firms make CVC investments relative to years in which they make no investments.  
Moreover, if CVC investments are subject to diminishing returns, the coefficients on each 
quartile should become progressively larger, but the difference between quartiles should 
become smaller.  Figure 1 shows this effect visually by plotting the coefficients 
associated with the quartile ranges reported in column 5, and indicates that the results are 
broadly supportive of this prediction.  Interestingly, the results in column 5 suggest that 
having a few CVC investments in a firm’s portfolio (the first quartile) does not improve 
performance significantly from not investing at all (the omitted category.)  It is only at 
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higher levels (quartiles 2–4) that CVC investing improves performance and that 
diminishing returns are observed—apart from the 1st quartile, the differences in the 
estimated coefficients across quartiles is statistically significant.  Based on the results of 
column 5, moving from the first quartile to the second is expected to increase 
performance by 1.29% (2.33% - 1.04%), while moving from the third quartile to the 
fourth increases performance by only 0.31% (4.01% - 3.7%).   Hence, as predicted, the 
magnitude of added improvement becomes progressively smaller as portfolio size 
increases, which is consistent with diminishing returns to these investments. 
Finally, I test hypothesis 4 (regarding the relatedness of the CVC investments to 
the firm being acquired) in Table 5.  Because the amount of related versus unrelated 
investing is only relevant for firms undertaking investments, Table 5 only includes firms 
that made CVC investments.  Each specification includes a fixed-effect for each acquirer.  
Column 1 is repeated from Table 4 for comparison purposes.  In Column 2 I only include 
investments that the acquirer made in IT firms.  The coefficient remains statistically 
significant (p<.01), but becomes roughly half the magnitude of the former coefficient.  In 
Column 3, the total count of CVC investments is split into whether they were in IT 
startups or not and added separately into the regression.  Interestingly, the coefficients on 
both the related (invests in IT startups) and seemingly unrelated investments (investments 
in startups not in IT) are statistically significant and almost equal in magnitude (0.0102 
versus 0.0096).  As a robustness check, in Columns 4-6 I substitute the dollar value of the 
CVC investments for the count of CVC investments and re-estimate my models.  The 
patterns in both sets of analysis (Columns 1-3 versus. Columns 4-6) are very similar—the 
coefficient when I limit investments in IT startups are significant, but roughly half the 
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magnitude of the coefficient on overall investments, and the investments in both IT and 
Non-IT startups have a significant effect on acquisition returns (and almost equal in 
magnitude).  Finally, in Columns 7-10 I examine more closely what is driving the results 
for the Non-IT investments.  For example, VentureOne classifies software firms as Life 
Science if they are involved in making software for life science industries.  In Columns 7-
10 I re-classified these startups from Life Science to IT and re-calculated my regressions.  
In Columns 7 and 9, once investments in medical software startups are classified as IT 
investments, the coefficient on IT investments increases in magnitude (relative to the 
coefficients in Columns 2 and 5, respectively).  Interestingly, even with this re-
classification, investments in Non-IT startups continue to have a significant effect on IT 
acquisitions (see Columns 8 and 10).  Taken together, however, these results run contrary 
to hypothesis 4, where I hypothesized that the returns to making investments in IT 
startups would have a larger effect than investments not in IT.     
 
3.4 Discussion & Conclusion 
How firms purchase strategic inputs for less than their ultimate “value in use” is a 
central question in strategy research (Barney 1986).  This issue has become more salient 
in recent years, as established firms have increasingly acquired startups as “inputs” to 
develop new products and new technologies (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Chaudhuri & 
Tabrizi, 1999; Link, 1988; Puranam et al., 2006).  Such acquisitions, nonetheless, pose 
significant challenges to acquirers because young, technology-intensive companies can 
be particularly difficult to value and integrate.  In this paper, I used strategic factor 
market theory (Barney 1986) to suggest that firms’ investments in external information, 
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to the extent that it provided information that was relevant and private, could grant them 
an information advantage in markets to acquire technology startups.  This study provides 
new evidence that such investments (in this case, minority equity investments in startups) 
can improve acquisition performance, even when acquiring startups in which the firm has 
not invested (non-portfolio firms). 
Two other results merit discussion.  In Table 3, I examine how long the 
information benefits of CVC investing persist.  The results suggest that the benefits of 
CVC investing dissipate rather quickly, with the effect almost entirely eroded after two 
years (the current year and the prior year), which is consistent with prior studies 
examining learning from strategic alliances (Sampson, 2005).  As in this study, Sampson 
(2005) finds that alliances beyond the prior year have little to no effect on current 
performance.  This rapid depreciation could be due to the rapid pace of change in the 
information technology sector, or to more organizational processes such as managerial 
turnover that can lead to organizational forgetting (e.g. Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 
1990).  However, because both studies used the IT sector as their setting, it is impossible 
to separate out the influence of these two processes.  More generally, the slower the pace 
of technological change in an industry, the longer the information benefits of external 
investments should endure.   Therefore, an intriguing possibility for future research is to 
examine how long information advantages persist in different sectors, and how this varies 
with the rate of technological change. 
Table 3 also examines whether CVC investments are subject to diminishing 
returns.  While I find evidence of diminishing returns, my results also suggest that firms 
need to reach a “critical mass” before CVC investments provide any benefit.  In terms of 
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improved performance when acquiring startups, “dabbling” with a few investments (the 
first quartile in counts of portfolio companies) conferred little advantage over foregoing 
such activities entirely (the omitted category).  In contrast, investors with larger numbers 
of startups in their venture portfolios accrued considerable gains.  
This combination of rapid depreciation and significant threshold effects has at 
least two implications for managers.  The first is that making a few investments or 
making investments over a short period of time will provide little benefit; rather firms 
must be consistently investing in order to sustain their advantage.  The second 
implication is that it may be that only large firms with sufficient resources can reap the 
benefits of CVC investing, with the benefits to smaller firms being much smaller than 
those estimated in this paper.  Together, these two characteristics may explain why the 
firms that choose to invest are significantly larger and have considerably greater cash 
flow (as a percentage of assets) than firms that do not.  In that view, instead of making a 
mistake, these small firms may be rationally choosing not to invest. 15 
The results of this study also suggest a modification to the advice provided by the 
prior literature on acquisition “coping mechanisms.”  In general, this literature has 
emphasized the benefits of delaying acquisitions of startups, by prolonging negotiations 
or by postponing acquisition until the target has “proven” its value in an IPO (Coff, 1999, 
2003; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008; Reuer & Shen, 2004).  However, while acquirers may 
benefit from waiting (in the form of gaining better information), this information comes 
at a cost.  As targets are better able to signal their value to the market, other acquirers are 
                                                 
15 Such differences in the expected treatment effect have gained considerable attention in the recent 
program evaluation literature (Djebbari & Smith, 2008; Heckman, Urzua, & Vytlacil, 2006; Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 2001) and the literature on the returns to education (Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Tobias, 
2003).   
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also able to observe these signals, and opportunities for differential advantage may be 
dissipated.  Hence, delaying acquisition, instead of being a normative ideal, poses an 
interesting tradeoff between waiting for more information to be revealed and acting 
quickly to exploit market imperfections.  Indeed, the net benefits to acquirers are 
significantly lower for takeovers of startups that have already gone public relative to their 
private counterparts, a result that is consistent with a growing body of evidence from 
finance (Faccio et al., 2006; Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004). 
This study also highlights the seeming paradox regarding the effects of CVC 
investing on the acquisition of startups.  I find that CVC investing increases acquisition 
performance when acquiring startups overall, but that, paradoxically, acquirers perform 
worse with the subset of acquisitions about which they have the most information (the 
subset of firms they have directly invested in).  While this study does not test whether 
acquirers “overpay” per se when acquiring portfolio firms, in line with my results from 
chapter 2, I continue to find that returns to acquiring portfolio firms are significantly 
lower.  Hence, this paper suggests that CVC investments may provide information 
benefits when making acquisitions, but that becoming too close to a potential acquisition 
can make acquirers susceptible to well-known decision biases such as overconfidence 
and escalation of commitment (Brockner, 1992; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008; Staw, 1981).  If true, then one of the managerial 
implications of this study might be, “keep investing, but keep your distance.”   
Finally, the results of this study suggest a new line of inquiry for strategic alliance 
scholars.  As mentioned, prior work generally examined using alliances to (1) develop 
capabilities in a new technology area (Inkpen, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996; Simonin, 
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1999) or (2) to gain experience that is valuable when forming new strategic alliances 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002; Sampson, 2005).  This study suggests a third 
potential benefit – prior strategic alliance experience may provide information that is 
valuable for other types of business development activities.  Hence, several fruitful areas 
of future research involve examining what types of information are most valuable and 
what is the most efficient way to collect them?  What are the boundary conditions that 
limit the applicability of information from one realm to the other?  And finally, how do 
firms become more effective at transferring this information internally?  
Like most studies, this research is not without its limitations.  One key limitation 
is the lack of a finer-grained measure of private information.  While I have interpreted my 
findings as a sign that corporate venture capital provides investing firms with information 
advantages, I am unable to measure the quality or quantity of information directly.  Thus, 
while the impact of CVC investing on acquisition performance conforms to what I would 
expect if CVC investments provided enhanced information, I am not able to conclusively 
rule out that the benefit of CVC investing is not due to other causes.  Moreover, while I 
have argued that CVC investments provide three types of information that may be 
valuable, I am unable to distinguish which, if any, of these categories of information 
provides the most benefit, or to establish the relative importance of each type. Future 
research will benefit from better measures of private information available to acquirers.  
A second limitation is that I am not able to observe how information gained 
through CVC investment activities gets transferred within the firm to inform the 
acquisition process. Hence, each of these areas is a fruitful arena for future research.  In 
particular, rich qualitative research that describes what information managers gather and 
 107
how this information gets used inside the acquiring firm is greatly needed, and offers 
fertile ground for additional contribution.  
  In summary, this study was motivated by a tension in the entrepreneurial 
literature on the acquisitions of technology startups: while acquisitions of startups are 
difficult, it is only under conditions of uncertainty that abnormal gains are possible.  
Moreover, to succeed in such markets, acquirers must have more accurate expectations 
than other bidders regarding the future value of targets.  If this is true, then understanding 
how firms improve their ability to collect, interpret, and disseminate private information 
becomes a crucial question in strategy research.  This study provides new insights by 
examining the role of external investments in startups as one source of “information 
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Table 3.1 Prior literature on information asymmetry and acquisitions 
Study Key idea Data & Sample Conclusions 
Coff (1999).  “How 
buyers cope with 
uncertainty when 
acquiring firms in 
knowledge-intensive 
industries: Caveat 
emptor.”  Organization 
Science, 10(2): 144-161. 
Are buyers more likely 
to adopt coping 





The key argument is that 
greater knowledge-
intensity makes the 
quality of the target 
more difficult to 
ascertain.   
 
Hence, as uncertainty 
around target firm 
increases, acquirers are 
more likely to adopt 
coping strategies (such 
as lengthening 
negotiations.) 
Coff analyzes 218 
acquisitions made 1988-
1999.  Both buyer and 
target were public.  To 
be included in sample, 
both the deal value and 
deal terms needed to be 
disclosed.  Target had to 




companies in many low-
tech industries (waste 
disposal, floor 
coverings) although a 
breakdown by industry 
is not provided. 
Main measure is the 
knowledge-intensity of 
the industry (from a 
survey by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics [BLS]). 
 
Coff finds that, for 
targets in knowledge-
intensive industries, 
acquirers are more likely 
to: 
 
1) Offer a lower 
premium 
2) Offer more stock (as 
part of deal terms) 
3) Lengthen the 
negotiation process. 
Coff (2002).  “Human 
capital, shared 
expertise, and the 
likelihood of impasse in 
corporate acquisitions.”  
Journal of Management, 
28(1): 107-128 
Similar to above.  
Increasing human 
capital makes it more 
difficult for the acquirer 
to ascertain value.  
Moreover, as the human 
capital increases, the 
acquirer is more 
dependent on retaining 
the human capital in 
order to create value 
with the acquisition.  
Hence, acquirers are 
more cautious about 
doing deals (and more 
likely to call off the 
acquisition). 
324 acquisition 
attempts, 1988-1999.  
(Same sample as above, 
but including acquisition 
attempts, not just 
completed acquisitions). 
 
DV is probability that 
the deal is completed. 
Main measure is the 
human capital of the 
industry (again, from the 
BLS survey).   
 
 
As human capital of the 
target (measured at the 
industry level) increases, 
the deal is more likely to 
be called off. 
Shen and Reuer (2005).   
“Adverse selection in 
acquisitions of small 
manufacturing firms: A 
comparison of public 








that are young and/or 
small.  In those cases, 
the acquirer is likely 
acquirer a publicly-
traded target (because 
being public increases 
the amount of info about 
the target, as well as 
signaling its value.) 
Their sample is 923 
acquisitions in 
manufacturing industries 
(SIC codes 20-39), 
between 1996-1999.  
Targets needed to have 
< 500 employees. 
 
Of targets, 49.5% are 
public.  Average target 
is 39 years old. 
Generally used industry-
level measures (except 
for target age and target 
strategic alliances). 
 
They find support for 
their thesis that as 
information asymmetry 
increases, acquirers are 
more likely to delay 
acquisition until the 
target is public.  Hence, 
acquirer is more likely 
to acquire a public 
target: 
Study Key idea Data & Sample Conclusions 
1) The younger the 
target 
2) The greater the 
target’s intangible assets 
(measured at industry 
level) 
3) The acquirer is in an 
unrelated industry 
(different 2-digit SIC 
code) as the target. 
Shen and Capron 
(2007).  “Acquisitions of 
private vs. public firms: 
Private information, 
target selection, and 




means it is hard to 
observe quality of target 
(particularly regarding 
the quality of its 
resources). 
 
Hence, acquirers are 
more likely to acquire 
public targets when (1) 
target is in an unfamiliar 
industry or (2) target has 
high-level of intangible 
assets. 
Their sample is 101 
acquisitions made by 
publicly-traded 
acquirers in Europe, 
1988-1992.   
 
Of targets, 57% are 
public.  Average target 
is 54 years old. 
They find support for 
their hypotheses, 
however their empirics 
are problematic. 
1) For the portion that 
uses a CAR, they use 
very long windows: [-
20,+1] is the shortest 
window they use. 
 
2) They use a Heckman 











Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics & Correlation Matrix (n = 526) 









 No. Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1      Prominent CVC investor? 0.464 0.499 1
2      Active CVC Investor in that year 0.346 0.476 0.78 1
3      CVC Amount (3yrs) 86.183 226.384 0.41 0.51 1
4  CVC Count (3yrs) 16.770 52.080 0.35 0.43 0.93 1     
5      R&D Intensity 53.888 51.476 -0.12 -0.01 0.07 0.04 1
6      Startup Acquisition Experience 5.861 8.043 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.45 0.21 1
7      Startup Acquisition Experience 
2 
98.914 317.616 0.31 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.18 0.91 1
8      Acquirer Size (BV Assets) 7.095 2.285 0.77 0.69 0.49 0.41 -0.05 0.56 0.35 1
9      Free Cash Flow (% assets) -0.048 1.640 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.15 1
10      Prior CVC investment in that startup? 0.095 0.294 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.24 -0.01 0.20 0.15 0.28 0.04
11      Target Age 5.089 2.940 -0.14 -0.21 -0.19 -0.13 -0.17 -0.21 -0.15 -0.15 0.02
12      Target Public 0.141 0.348 0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.07
13      Relative Size 0.072 0.133 -0.36 -0.31 -0.19 -0.16 -0.01 -0.25 -0.15 -0.48 -0.28
14      Payment included stock? 0.546 0.498 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.25 0.05 0.09 -0.22 -0.08
15      Deal terms undisclosed? 0.243 0.430 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.16 0.00 -0.06 0.21 0.06
16      Tech boom period (1999-2000) 0.302 0.460 0.04 0.19 0.27 0.19 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.08 -0.12
17      Post boom (2001-2003) 0.314 0.464 -0.09 -0.12 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.02
No. Variable Mean S.D. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
11      Target Age 5.089 2.940 1
12      Target Public 0.141 0.348 0.38 1
13      Relative Size 0.072 0.133 0.22 0.31 1
14      Payment included stock? 0.546 0.498 -0.09 0.16 0.27 1 
15      Deal terms undisclosed? 0.243 0.430 -0.02 -0.22 -0.27 -0.59 1
16      Tech boom period (1999-2000) 0.302 0.460 -0.13 0.04 -0.03 0.29 -0.15 1
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able 3.3 Descriptive Statistics Comparing CVC Investors and Non-Investors 
eans of the 219 acquirers included in the sample, split between CVC investors and non-
tion is a firm-year average.  All dollar amounts (except 
illions of constant 1996 dollars; R&D Intensity is expressed in 
ployee (R&D / Employee).  Employees is expressed in 
Age is the number of years the firm is listed in Compustat.  CVC Count is the 
ents in startups the firm made that year; CVC Amount is the dollar 
mount invested in startups that year. 
Sales ($96 mil)    11,761.6        446.4      2,954.7  
  
 of CVC Investors and Non-Investors 
OLS 
star
estimates of acquirer returns to acquisition announcements. The dependent variable is the two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal return. Sample includes 526 
tups (less than 12 yrs old) acquired in information technology industries, 1987–2003.  Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Acquirer is a prominent CVC investor 0.0093 0.0010 0.0023 0.0039 0.0036 0.0019 -0.0040 -0.0017
[0.0076] [0.0072] [0.0072] [0.0074] [0.0074] [0.0089] [0.0099] [0.0078]
Acquirer is active CVC investor in current yr? 0.0160*** 0.0391**
[0.0058] [0.0200]
CVC spending ($mil, ln) 0.0041** 0.0042** 0.0041** 0.0043* 0.0038**
[0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0021] [0.0023] [0.0018]
Count of CVC investments (ln) 0.0046*
[0.0025]
Acquirer Characteristics
R&D Intensity 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Startup Acquisition Experience 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0004
[0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0012] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0007]
Startup Acquisition Experience2 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Size (ln assets) 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0034 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0005
[0.0018] [0.0022] [0.0023] [0.0032] [0.0025] [0.0024] [0.0026] [0.0030] [0.0031] [0.0025]
Cash flow (as % assets) 0.0033 0.0032 0.0031 0.0029* 0.0031 0.0031 0.0030 0.0032 0.0016 0.0031
[0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0023] [0.0025]
Target & Deal Characteristics
Acquirer has prior VC investment in target? -0.0124* -0.0144** -0.0135** -0.0122 -0.0152** -0.0159*** -0.0155** -0.0154** -0.0177*** -0.0140**
[0.0066] [0.0063] [0.0061] [0.0098] [0.0061] [0.0061] [0.0062] [0.0067] [0.0066] [0.0064]
Target age 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0031*** 0.0028** 0.0029* 0.0043 0.0032***
[0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0017] [0.0026] [0.0010]
Target is public? -0.0276** -0.0283*** -0.0277*** -0.0266*** -0.0271** -0.0274** -0.0239* -0.0204 -0.0228 -0.0252**
[0.0108] [0.0107] [0.0106] [0.0093] [0.0107] [0.0107] [0.0122] [0.0151] [0.0179] [0.0107]
Relative size 0.0040 0.0050 0.0033 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0020 -0.0072 0.0063 -0.0790 -0.0051
[0.0471] [0.0468] [0.0465] [0.0267] [0.0470] [0.0470] [0.0557] [0.0686] [0.0690] [0.0469]
Payment included stock? 0.0060 0.0051 0.0045 0.0044 0.0042 0.0046 0.0045 0.0045 0.0023 0.0038
[0.0062] [0.0063] [0.0064] [0.0074] [0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0067] [0.0072] [0.0082] [0.0065]
Deal terms undisclosed? -0.0055 -0.0058 -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0056 -0.0054 -0.0061 -0.0072 -0.0153* -0.0056
[0.0069] [0.0070] [0.0070] [0.0080] [0.0071] [0.0070] [0.0072] [0.0074] [0.0081] [0.0070]
Tech boom period (1999-2000) -0.0084 -0.0071 -0.0084 -0.0102 -0.0105 -0.0099 -0.0100 -0.0138 -0.0200* -0.0099
[0.0079] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0074] [0.0086] [0.0085] [0.0090] [0.0097] [0.0105] [0.0085]
Post boom (2001-2003) 0.0153** 0.0170** 0.0180** 0.0194*** 0.0161** 0.0157** 0.0170** 0.0160** 0.0079 0.0139*
[0.0069] [0.0072] [0.0072] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0071] [0.0077] [0.0078] [0.0072]
Constant -0.0284* -0.0244 -0.0216 -0.0072 -0.0164 -0.0192 -0.0129 -0.0182 -0.0139 -0.0175
[0.0163] [0.0167] [0.0167] [0.0205] [0.0180] [0.0175] [0.0191] [0.0214] [0.0221] [0.0179]
Inverse Mills ratio (λ) -0.0148
[0.0117]
Observations 526 526 526 526 526 526 498 441 367 526
R-squared 0.057 0.059 0.063 - 0.063 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.086 0.056
Chi-squared - - - 192.7 - - - - - -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 - 1st stage of Heckman model is shown in Appendix 1.  
Table 3.4 Acquirer Returns Using Full Sample
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Main results Robustness Checks
VARIABLES





Col 3: Prior 
year only
















Count of CVC investments - 3yr (ln) 0.0101*** 0.0109*** 0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0097***
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0025] [0.0029] [0.0022]
Count of CVC investments - current yr (ln) 0.0085**
[0.0036]
Count of CVC investments - prior yr (ln) 0.0139***
[0.0034]
Count of CVC investments - two yrs ago (ln) 0.0044
[0.0027]
Count of CVC investments - 1st quartile (1-8 inv.) 0.0104
Count of CVC i
Count of CVC i
Count of CVC i
 CVC Investors (with Acquirer Fixed 
ffects)  
LS estimates of acquirer returns to acquisition announcements. The dependent variable is the two-day (-
,0) cumulative abnormal return. Sample includes 526 startups (less than 12 yrs old) acquired in 
formation technology industries, 1987–2003.  Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in 
arentheses. 
[0.0072]
nvestments - 2nd quartile (9-25 inv.) 0.0233**
[0.0089]
nvestments - 3rd quartile (26-74 inv.) 0.0370***
[0.0132]







Cash flow (as %















*** p<0.01, ** p
acteristics
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
tion Experience -0.0017* -0.0016** -0.0019* -0.0017* -0.0017* -0.0019** -0.0017* -0.0013 -0.0018**
[0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0008]
tion Experience2 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000**
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
-0.0016 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0029 -0.0013 -0.0014 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0022
[0.0032] [0.0026] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0044] [0.0035] [0.0034] [0.0037] [0.0034]
 assets) -0.0220 -0.0334 -0.0207 -0.0177 -0.0266 -0.0152 -0.0004 -0.0146 -0.0102
[0.0263] [0.0225] [0.0265] [0.0262] [0.0303] [0.0249] [0.0325] [0.0316] [0.0267]
aracteristics
ior VC investment in target? -0.0211*** -0.0215*** -0.0208*** -0.0206*** -0.0204*** -0.0210*** -0.0215*** -0.0195*** -0.0183***
[0.0056] [0.0059] [0.0053] [0.0057] [0.0059] [0.0055] [0.0060] [0.0065] [0.0063]
0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0006
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0009] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0009]
? -0.0168*** -0.0173*** -0.0152** -0.0180*** -0.0187*** -0.0125** -0.0147** -0.0140 -0.0154**
[0.0057] [0.0055] [0.0059] [0.0058] [0.0064] [0.0049] [0.0064] [0.0084] [0.0063]
0.0126 0.0117 0.0139 0.0238 0.0235 0.0170 0.0657** 0.0750** -0.0195
[0.0285] [0.0279] [0.0311] [0.0259] [0.0337] [0.0298] [0.0276] [0.0339] [0.0461]
uded stock? -0.0047 -0.0014 -0.0069 -0.0023 -0.0037 -0.0059 -0.0106 -0.0127 -0.0084
[0.0077] [0.0070] [0.0075] [0.0083] [0.0084] [0.0075] [0.0084] [0.0078] [0.0080]
sclosed? -0.0067 -0.0064 -0.0079 -0.0072 -0.0068 -0.0071 -0.0044 -0.0073 -0.0097*
[0.0058] [0.0057] [0.0053] [0.0059] [0.0062] [0.0057] [0.0066] [0.0066] [0.0056]
iod (1999-2000) -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0123 -0.0025 -0.0111 -0.0142 -0.0169** -0.0161 -0.0112
[0.0087] [0.0094] [0.0083] [0.0075] [0.0109] [0.0084] [0.0082] [0.0098] [0.0088]
2003) -0.0001 0.0122 0.0007 0.0079 0.0069 0.0007 -0.0020 -0.0014 0.0032
[0.0090] [0.0086] [0.0087] [0.0106] [0.0100] [0.0086] [0.0093] [0.0090] [0.0099]
0.0208 0.0121 0.0190 -0.0101 0.0172 0.0162 0.0044 0.0126 0.0238
[0.0261] [0.0214] [0.0255] [0.0263] [0.0310] [0.0277] [0.0278] [0.0307] [0.0280]
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
242 242 242 242 242 233 205 180 242
quirers 34 34 34 34 34 33 32 30 34
0.163 0.151 0.186 0.127 0.154 0.174 0.190 0.184 0.136
26.3 31.3 24.6 32.3 25.5 34.1 27.6 37.7 25.3
<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 3.6 Acquirer Returns Using Relatedness of CVC investments to Acquisitions 
Medical software classified as "Life Science" Medical software classified as "IT"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Count of CVC investments - 3yr (ln) 0.0101***
[0.0022]
Count of CVC investments - IT 0.0056*** 0.0102*** 0.0094*** 0.0107***
[0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0021] [0.0022]
Count of CVC investments - Not in IT 0.0096** 0.0079*
[0.0037] [0.0044]
CVC Spending - 3yr ($mil, ln) 0.0068***
[0.0017]
CVC Spending - 3yr IT 0.0035*** 0.0068*** 0.0059*** 0.0070***
[0.0012] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0017]
CVC Spending - 3yr Not in IT 0.0068** 0.0063**
[0.0026] [0.0028]
Acquirer Characteristics
R&D Intensity -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Startup Acquisition Experience -0.0017* -0.0016* -0.0017* -0.0019** -0.0016* -0.0019** -0.0019* -0.0018* -0.0020** -0.0019**
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
Startup Acquisition Experience2 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000*
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Size (ln assets) -0.0016 0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0027 0.002 -0.0027 -0.0006 -0.0018 -0.001 -0.0027
[0.0032] [0.0028] [0.0033] [0.0038] [0.0029] [0.0039] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0036] [0.0037]
Cash flow (as % assets) -0.0220 -0.0242 -0.0222 -0.0236 -0.0253 -0.0236 -0.0173 -0.0205 -0.0208 -0.0232
[0.0263] [0.0272] [0.0266] [0.0273] [0.0273] [0.0274] [0.0271] [0.0267] [0.0284] [0.0278]
Target & Deal Characteristics
Acquirer has prior VC investment in target? -0.0211*** -0.0203*** -0.0210*** -0.0206*** -0.0203*** -0.0206*** -0.0210*** -0.0211*** -0.0208*** -0.0206***
[0.0056] [0.0057] [0.0055] [0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0056] [0.0058] [0.0056] [0.0058] [0.0057]
Target age 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
Target is public? -0.0168*** -0.0166*** -0.0166*** -0.0185*** -0.0178*** -0.0185*** -0.0157** -0.0163*** -0.0178*** -0.0183***
[0.0057] [0.0058] [0.0057] [0.0056] [0.0058] [0.0057] [0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0057]
Relative size 0.0126 0.0191 0.012 0.0162 0.0218 0.0162 0.0139 0.0112 0.0169 0.0157
[0.0285] [0.0267] [0.0284] [0.0286] [0.0264] [0.0283] [0.0286] [0.0287] [0.0279] [0.0285]
Payment included stock? -0.0047 -0.0016 -0.0046 -0.0042 -0.0011 -0.0042 -0.0031 -0.0046 -0.0021 -0.0041
[0.0077] [0.0073] [0.0077] [0.0078] [0.0073] [0.0079] [0.0075] [0.0077] [0.0076] [0.0078]
Deal terms undisclosed? -0.0067 -0.0071 -0.0068 -0.0074 -0.0075 -0.0074 -0.0064 -0.0066 -0.0073 -0.0074
[0.0058] [0.0060] [0.0058] [0.0064] [0.0063] [0.0063] [0.0061] [0.0059] [0.0066] [0.0065]
Tech boom period (1999-2000) -0.0129 -0.006 -0.0128 -0.0103 -0.0047 -0.0103 -0.0082 -0.0125 -0.0057 -0.0101
[0.0087] [0.0072] [0.0088] [0.0084] [0.0071] [0.0085] [0.0080] [0.0088] [0.0078] [0.0085]
Post boom (2001-2003) -0.0001 0.0070 -0.0001 0.0045 0.0094 0.0045 0.0040 0.0001 0.0085 0.0047
[0.0090] [0.0098] [0.0090] [0.0090] [0.0097] [0.0091] [0.0094] [0.0090] [0.0097] [0.0090]
Constant 0.0208 -0.0069 0.0203 0.0262 -0.0053 0.0262 0.0114 0.0215 0.0136 0.0266
[0.0261] [0.0226] [0.0265] [0.0281] [0.0225] [0.0288] [0.0258] [0.0264] [0.0261] [0.0280]
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242
R-squared 0.163 0.14 0.163 0.164 0.138 0.164 0.154 0.164 0.151 0.164











igure 3.1  Acquisition Performance by CVC Investment Quartile (Sub-sample of 
VC Investors) 
oefficients on CVC quartile variable (from Table 4, column 5).  All models are relative 
ade no CVC investments.  Firm-fixed effects are included in 
odel.  Note that the coefficient on the 1st quartile is not significantly different from 
aking no investment.  All other coefficients are significant at p<0.05. 

















































Did firm make CVC 
invstmnt in acq 
year? (No 
correction)
Did firm make CVC 





Acquirer is active CVC investor in current yr? 0.0160*** 0.0391**
[0.0058] [0.0200]
CVC spending ($mil, ln)
Count of CVC investments (ln)
Acquirer Characteristics
R&D Intensity 0.0000 0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0001]
Startup Acquisition Experience -0.0000 -0.0003
[0.0007] [0.0012]
Startup Acquisition Experience2 0.0000 0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000]
Size (ln assets) -0.0006 -0.0034
[0.0023] [0.0032]
Cash flow (as % assets) 0.0031 0.0029*
[0.0025] [0.0018]
Target & Deal Characteristics
Acquirer has prior VC investment in target? -0.0135** -0.0122
[0.0061] [0.0098]
Target age 0.0032*** 0.0032***
[0.0011] [0.0011]
Target is public? -0.0277*** -0.0266***
[0.0106] [0.0093]
Relative size 0.0033 -0.0013
[0.0465] [0.0267]
Payment included stock? 0.0045 0.0044
[0.0064] [0.0074]
Deal terms undisclosed? -0.0057 -0.0058
[0.0070] [0.0080]
Tech boom period (1999-2000) -0.0084 -0.0102
[0.0080] [0.0074]









Size (ln assets) 0.6149***
[0.0493]








Observations 526 526 526
R-squared - 0.063 -
Chi-squared 192.7 - 192.7
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






As startups have become more important actors in research and innovation, it is 
not surprising that established firms have acquired them in ever greater numbers.  
Moreover, given the very real risks associated with such acquisitions, it is also not 
surprising that managers have experimented with ways to reduce that risk, such as by 
“trying before they buy” through equity investments in those startups.   By examining the 
tradeoffs associated with using corporate venture capital to inform acquisition decisions, 
this dissertation sheds new light on this important managerial issue. 
The findings of this research have several implications for both theory and 
practice.  Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to at least three literatures.  First, this 
research contributes to the nascent literature on corporate venture capital.  Despite the 
large body of survey and anecdotal evidence that established firms use CVC investments 
to identify and screen potential acquisition targets, prior empirical work has ignored this 
aspect of corporate venture capital investing.  Indeed, this study represents the first 
systematic study to examine: (1) the extent to which firms use equity investments to 
screen potential acquisitions, and (2) how such investments affect subsequent acquisition 
performance (if at all.) While prior studies have examined the financial returns of 
corporate venture capital (Gompers and Lerner, 1998) or the impact of CVC investments 
on internal R&D (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006;  Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006), the use of 
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corporate venture capital to reduce information asymmetries in acquisitions has not been 
previously explored. 
Second, this research contributes more generally to the emerging literature on 
technology acquisitions, particularly the “coping mechanisms” available to firms when 
making decisions under high uncertainty (Coff, 1999; Reuer and Raggozzsino, 2006; 
Shen & Reuer, 2005).  However, this literature has largely focused on mechanisms for 
entrepreneurial firms to signal their value to others.  Consequently, the literature has 
under-emphasized means by which acquirers may reduce information asymmetry while 
still preserving the opportunity for gain.  By examining one way that acquirers may gain 
an information advantage relative to others, I hope this dissertation will help to move this 
literature beyond a focus on the challenge of acquiring startups to the opportunities for 
strategic advantage in this important factor market.         
 Finally, this dissertation also addresses a key question that has been understudied 
in the resource-based view (RBV); namely, how do firms purchase the resources they 
need at a price that allows them to create competitive advantage?  Although Barney 
(1986) acknowledged that more accurate expectations can lead to competitive advantage, 
he did not elaborate on how firms could develop this improved foresight.  Indeed, in the 
original 1986 article, Barney was skeptical that firms could improve their performance 
through external information, arguing that this information would be in the public domain 
(and hence available to all).  Consequently, subsequent research has largely focused on 
advantages through better use of internal information.  This dissertation contributes to the 
RBV by suggesting, and empirically testing, whether firms’ external investments may 
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provide the type of valuable, private information that can explain systematic performance 
differences in takeover markets for entrepreneurial firms.  
The results of this dissertation also have implications for managers.  First, the 
results suggest that CVC investing can have two opposing impacts on acquisition 
performance.  On the one hand, CVC investing can increase overall acquisition 
performance when acquiring startups.  At the same time, CVC investing can make 
managers prone to destroy value when acquiring their portfolio companies.  If correct, 
then one implication for managers may be, “keep investing, but recognize the challenges 
of such investments.” 
 A second implication for managers is that CVC investing may provide 
information benefits in the form of information not available to rivals, but that such 
information has a short “shelf life.”  For instance, the results in Chapter 3 indicate that 
only investments made in the current or prior year had any effect on acquisition 
performance.  In contrast, investments made in earlier years had little to no impact on 
current acquisitions.  Thus, while CVC investing may provide an advantage, that 
advantage is fleeting; moreover, once the firm ceases to invest, it loses its advantage. 
 Finally, given the information benefits that CVC investing can provide, managers 
might be tempted to conclude that firms not making such investments are making a 
mistake.  However, such a conclusion would be premature.  The firms in my sample that 
choose to make CVC investments are considerably larger and control considerably 
greater cash flow than firms that do not.  If it is the case that only large firms with ample 
resources can exploit the benefits of CVC investing, then the returns to CVC investing to 
small firms may be smaller (and perhaps much smaller) than those estimated in this 
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dissertation.  If true, then small firms, instead of making a mistake are rationally choosing 
not to investment. 
 This research also points to several directions for future research.  First, future 
studies could probe more deeply into why and how CVC program structure changes firm 
investing behavior.    For example, I find that dedicated units are less likely to overpay 
when acquiring portfolio firms, and that they are also less likely to “throw good money 
after bad” by continuing to reinvest in their underperforming portfolio firms.  This 
finding begs the question, what is it that dedicated groups do differently from other 
corporate groups making CVC investments?  Is it that dedicated units attract higher 
quality managers or managers with different perspectives?  Or is it that dedicated units 
have incentives that are more closely attuned to the performance of their investments?  
Or, finally, is it that dedicated units are more likely to adopt practices that allow them to 
make better investment decisions?  Answering these questions will require finer-grained 
data regarding the individuals, the practices, and the incentives of the different types of 
CVC groups, particularly for the non-dedicated groups (about whom data is much harder 
to come by.)   
A second, related question is, if dedicated units outperform non-dedicated units, 
why do so many firms relegate their venture financing activities to non-dedicated units 
(e.g. product groups or other corporate departments?)  More generally, future studies 
could explore the tradeoffs that firms face when designing CVC programs.  For example, 
while dedicated units may facilitate better decisions regarding the acquisition of or 
reinvestment in portfolio firms, such units may also pose organizational barriers that 
reduce the transfer of knowledge gleaned from the investments to other groups within the 
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firm.  Future studies could also investigate more fully the process by which information 
gathered through CVC investing moves to other parts of the organization.   
Finally, future work could examine what types of information are most valuable 
and is CVC investing the most efficient way to collect it?  For example, how does the 
information gained through CVC investments (which by definition involve an equity 
stake) differ in degree or in kind from information gathered through strategic alliances 
(e.g. without an equity stake?)  In other words, could established firms gain a similar 
advantage merely through forming alliances with technology startups, or is the equity 
stake required?  For example, it may be that the equity stake, by increasing the alignment 
between startup and CVC investor, may increase the interaction between the two (and 
thus provide better information.)  On the other hand, the equity stake creates a potential 
sunk cost on the part of the investor, which may promote an “escalation of commitment”, 
particularly to portfolio firms that underperform.   
 Established firms have dramatically increased their willingness to finance 
technology startups.  This dissertation advances the field by identifying and empirically 
testing the effects of corporate venture capital on the performance of firms in 
entrepreneurial takeover markets.   
 
 
 
 
